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Abstract
The Effects of A Short-Term Parent Education Program on
the Moral Development of Latency Age Children
February 1983
Catherine O'Connell Leveroni
B . A . University of Massachusetts-Boston, 1974
M. Ed Bridgewater State College, 1980
Directed by Ena V. Nuttall, Ph.D., Associate Professor
of Education, Chairperson
The purpose of this study was to investigate the
effects of a short-term parent training program in the use
of induction and the concepts of cognitive-developmental
theory on the moral reasoning of latency age children. An
extensive review of the literature on moral development
indicated that parental use of induction correlates with
advanced moral development in their children while no parent
education program was found which taught parents how to use
induction. A Kohlberg-type intervention was designed for
parents of latency-age children.
A volunteer sample of thirty 8 and 9 year old
children and their mothers participated in the study. All
subjects were white, low to middle income students enrolled
in regular third grade classes of neighborhood public
schools. Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental
or control group status
.
All subjects were pre, post and follow-up tested
with alternate forms of Piaget dilemma stories using
the
VI
clinical interview method to assess their levels of moral
reasoning on five dimensions. Posttest was administered
two weeks after the final training session. Follow-up
test was given three months after the posttest. All test
interviews were tape recorded in the child's school setting.
Interrater reliability for the testing instruments and
scoring procedures was .95.
Results indicate that a short-term program can
effectively train parents to use induction to advance the
moral reasoning level of their latency age children. While
both groups showed posttest mean gains only the experiment-
al group showed statistically significant gain t (14) =
2.510. p<.05.
It was concluded that moral dilemma discussions and
induction can be used to advance the moral reasoning of
latency age children. The research findings have
implications for parents and elementary teachers.
vn
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INTRODUCTION
Background of the Study
According to cognitive-developmental theory (Piaget,
1965; Kohlberg, 1958) moral maturation is the result of a
process of evolution in moral judgment. The factors which
affect the growth of moral judgment are the concurrent
changes in cognitive structures and social interactions.
Piaget's studies concentrated on moral judgment in
young children. Building on this, Kohlberg (1958) elabor-
ated six stages of moral reasoning through adulthood.
Piaget's approach was mainly observational and descriptive
while Kohlberg' s research has led to a dynamic educational
approach with children who have reached adolescence and
formal operational thought (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975)
.
From his observations Piaget concluded that there are
three periods of moral judgment which coincide with three
distinct levels of cognitive organization; preoperationa)
,
operational and formal operational thought. Preoperat ional
children's (2-7 years) sense of right and wrong is based on
dependency and submission to adult authority figures. Right
is obedience; wrong is disobedience. Children in the
operational stage of cognitive development (7-11 years or
latency) experience awareness of other points of view from
their ability to see events from more than one perspective.
1
2Piaget believed that the notion of justice which arises
from the development of mutual respect and solidarity that
children hold among themselves leads to moral autonomy. It
is embedded in the voluntary acceptance of group norms. The
emergence of formal operational thought (around 12 years)
permits children to hypothesize beyond their immediate or
personal experience. They are able to conceptualize
principles and ideals of social justice.
In cognitive developmental theory, morality is the
natural outcome of a universal human tendency toward
empathy and concern for justice, reciprocity or equality in
human relationships (Kohlberg, 1975) . According to this
theory, the atmosphere which fosters moral development is
one which encourages role-taking and provides opportunities
to take the other's point of view. Kohlberg believes this
is related to social interactions, communications and the
child's sense of efficacy in influencing the attitudes of
others. Another important condition of the social atmos-
phere is the level of justice in the environment, the
preceived way rewards and punishments are distributed,
duties and privileges imposed. In the "just community"
(Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975) the youth is stimulated to
advance in moral reasoning and moral action. The "just
community" is seen as based in the school or kibbutz
(Reimer, 1977). Theoretically, it is the sense of comm-
unity which leads to positive behavior change.
3Concerned that advances in moral reasoning stage did
not necessarily lead to advances in moral behavior among
high school students, Kohlberg revised some of his earlier
positions in 1978. He now believes that the abstract con-
cept of moral stage is not sufficient for moral education.
Moral content and behavior must be taught. He believes
there is a universal need for rules of conduct and that
humans will behave according to these rules when they are
taught in an atmosphere in which the young feel affiliated
(Kohlberg, 1978)
.
From Piaget's cognitive-developmental theory it fol-
lows that latency is the period when the child's cognitive
structures for operational thought are ready to learn the
rules of moral conduct. This coincides with the tradition-
al age of reason at around age seven years. Prior to this
time the preoperational child experiences right and wrong
as residing in adult authority (Piaget, 1965) . Young
children are under the constant supervision of the adult
because they cannot retain and apply rules to their
conduct. Moving out into the world of peers and school
coincides with the child's ability to regulate behavior
by application of rules. Although Piaget (1965) says the
child learns rules from peer interactions it appears that
the relationship is concurrent not causal. He claims the
child learns the rules because cognitive structures permit
4it. The rules are tested and practiced in the peer milieu.
Content of the rules is of various determinants, mathemat-
ics, games, social conduct, morals. The latency age child
seeks the rule to order his or her universe and experience.
Latency
,
then is the optimal time to begin direct moral
education
.
"The period of concrete operations (age 7 to 11) de-
scribed by Piaget coincides with the latency period describ-
ed by psychoanalysis during which the 'family romance'
between children and their parents is at minimal intensity"
(Elkind, 1970, p. 55). Operational children are both
psychologically and cognitively ready for formal instruct-
ion which informs through induction and deduction.
If, as Kohlberg (1978) says, the acceptance of moral
rules comes within a nurturing, affiliative setting where
the ongoing interactions of the group members involve
substantial amounts of time and living together, then the
natural and logical settings for beginning direct moral
education of the child are the family and the elementary
classroom.
As early as 1971 Kohlberg said the effects of moral
education in the school "are weaker and more transient"
than within the family (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 212). It is
the assumption of this paper, in agreement with
Bronfenbrenner's (1977) proposed ecology of human develop-
ment, that parents and home are a microsystem among
several others, including school and peers, which teach
children moral values and behaviors.
Statement of the Problem
5
Although there is a widely held and respected body of
thought based on the cognitive-developmental theories of
Piaget and Kohlberg which holds that moral learning and
development take place only through peer interactions,
research findings document that parents play the most
significant role in the moral development of their children
(Berkowitz, 1964; Hoffman, 1970; Sears, Maccoby & Levin,
1957) . Parent education programs do not directly address
this critical area. Some are incongruent with cognitive-
developmental theory tenets of moral development. Converse-
ly, moral education based on cognitive-developmental theory
generally ignores research findings about the significance
of the parent-child relationship in the moral development
of children and focuses on the adolescent population and
the school's role in advancing moral reasoning.
Current parent education programs for younger
children focus on child management and require time
commitments many cannot make. Meanwhile, moral education
programs are primarily intended for use in schools with
adolescents. The latency period is almost entirely neg-
lected by moral educators as a period when the parent-
child bond can be strengthened against the vicissitudes of
6adolescence. Teaching parents how to take an active
positive role in the moral education of their children
through an understanding of the cognitive-developmental
processes involved in moral judgment and teaching them
how to use induction to promote empathy and concepts of
justice should promote moral growth in their children.
Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) found that parental use
of induction is the most facilitative form of discipline
for building long term controls in children which are
independent of external sanctions. Holstein (1969) found
that a powerful correlate of advanced moral development
in children was parental encouragement of the child's
participation in discussion of moral conflicts. This is
congruent with the research findings of Kohlberg, his
associates and others that exposure to higher stages of
reasoning and discussion of moral dilemmas using a Socratic
method promote advances in children's stages of moral
reasoning (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975)
.
Most of the research on intervention in the moral
development of young children has focused on Piaget's age
specificity and the advances from moral realism to moral
relativism (Bandura and McDonald, 1963; Nucci and Turiel,
1978; Wellman, Larkey and Somerville, 1979). This implies
that latency is a static state after the child reaches the
level of subjective responsibility on the intentionality/
7material damages dimenions around age seven. Piaget's
studies show a progression from egocentric to sociocentric
modes of thinking. His studies on the child's concept of
the lie indicate that within the latency years the concept
of subjective responsibility is undergoing refinements from
concrete material harm to abstract psychological harm. It
was not until age ten that all his subjects could define a
lie as the intention to deceive (Piaget, 1965)
.
Both Piaget and Kohlberg hypothesize that moral
cognition parallels the progress of operational thought.
Damon (1973) studied children from age 4 to 8 years. They
were studied to determine the relationship between operat-
ional thought and the concepts of justice. It was conclud-
ed that justice and operational reasoning support and
inform each other throughout early development. Advances
in operational reasoning are seen to lead to advances in
the justice domain.
Pationale
Parent education programs for young children do not
teach parents (a) an understanding of the cognitive-devel-
opmental process in the moral development of their children
or (b) how to use induction to advance the moral develop-
ment of their children.
The present study will undertake to apply Kohlberg s
intervention strategies with latency age children and their
parents in the natural setting of the home.
8Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study will be to investigate the
effects of a short-term parent training program on one
aspect of the moral development of their children. This
inquiry will pose the following questions:
1. Can parents be trained to use induction to
advance the moral judgment of their children through a
short-term training program?
2. Will children whose parents are trained to use
induction and who take a direct or active role in advanc-
ing the moral judgment of their children advance more
rapidly than children whose parents are not trained to use
induction as a direct intervention in their moral develop-
ment?
3. Are the effects of a short-term parent training
and intervention program more than transitory, i.e., is
there a permenant reorganization of the child's cognitive
structure?
4 . Can a short-term intervention by parents using
induction and direct moral education through Socratic
discussion advance the moral judgment of latency age child-
ren from objective responsibility to subjective responsi-
bility along the Piaget continuum?
Summary
Historically moral education and character formation
9have been the aim and objective of all education (VJilds and
Lottich, 1970; Dewey, 1934). The family, the school and
social institutions transmitted moral values from one
generation to the next with confidence and certitude. In
this century humanism, religious pluralism, technological
advances, rapid changes in family structure and other major
institutions have made parents and educators alike question
traditional moral values as well as methods of moral
education.
Parents are intensely interested in the moral develop-
ment and education of their children and seek guidance in
how to teach and train their children. There is a need
for parent education programs which address this area of
parents' concern. Mothers who are heavily committed be-
cause of employment outside of the home , large families,
and numerous other extraordinary demands on their time and
energy need a well-designed program which recognizes their
time constraints as well as their right to knowledge of
empirical findings which will enhance their role as moral
educators of their children.
A review of social learning theory, psychoanalytic
theory, humanistic theory and Adlerian theory indicates
that parents play a significant role in the moral develop-
ment of their children. Current research on the role of
parents in the moral development of their children indicat-
10
es that some parenting styles and practices correlate with
positive moral development in children while other parent-
ing styles and practices correlate with negative moral
behavior .in children (Hoffman, 1970 ; Sears, Maccoby fc. Levin,
1957; Bandura & Walters, 1959; Kagan, 1971; Roke
,
1980).
Chapter II will review the literature about theories
of moral development and the research findings on the
parent's role. Parent education programs will be reviewed
and research on moral education interventions will be
discussed.
The research design and methodology of the present
study will be presented in Chapter III. In Chapter IV the
research findings from this study will be analyzed. It is
anticipated that qualitative findings will be generated in
addition to the statistical data. These will be discussed
in the fifth and final chapter along with the implications
of the research project, summary and conclusions.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Current approaches to moral education reflect the
conflicting theories of psychologists concerning profoundly
different views of human nature and the ways in which
human personality and character develop to form the mature,
responsible, well-functioning adult from the dependent,
malleable young child. The four most influential theories
are social learning theory; psychoanalytic theory; human-
istic theory and cognitive-developmental theory. Each of
these theories will be reviewed because of its impact on
moral education within the school setting and published
parent education programs.
Following the discussion of theories of moral develop-
ment the literature on the role of parents in moral devel-
opment will be reviewed. Parent education programs will
be briefly reviewed for their congruence with cognitive-
development theory and research on moral development in
children. Moral education interventions will be looked
at for their relevance to the parent's role as moral
educator of the child.
Theories of Moral Development
A. Social Learning Theory
Learning theories assume that human nature is
neither
bad nor good, people simply respond to their
environment.
11
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Learning theory assumes that conditions of reward and
punishment lead to learning the values of the culture.
Guilt is the motive for morality, the child behaves morally
to avoid guilt ( Developmental Psychology Today
,
1971)
.
Moral failure is seen by social learning theory as
failure of instruction. It is failure to teach the child
moral rules and traditions or to provide adequate rewards
and models for good behavior (Gilligan, 1980).
"Morality" is conforming to cultural norms. Guilt is
failure to conform to them. Morality conceived of a univ-
ersal principles of justice and charity, based on reason
and free choice, does not exist. Social learning theory
implies that humans cannot transcend their cultural milieu.
Social learning theory emphasizes the roles of identi-
fication, imitation and modeling. Identification is an
important source of motivation (Sawrey and Telford, 1971;
Grasec, 1972) . Imitation is perpetuated or not be patterns
of reinforcement (Miller and Dollard, 1941) .
Bandura (1969) believes the sequence of developmental
change in the moral judgment of children to be a function
of changes in reinforcement contingencies and other learn-
ing variables rather than the unfolding of genetically
programmed response predispositions. He has demonstrated
that the learning process can be shortened by providing
social models (Bandura and Huston, 1961; Bandura, Ross and
13
Ross, 1961, 1963) and that moral judgment responses are not
only less age-specific than Piaget implies but also that
children's moral orientations can be altered and even
reversed by manipulation of response-reinforcement con-
tingencies and by the provisions of appropriate social
models (Bandura and McDonald, 1963)
.
While Bandura interpreted his research results to
support a social learning model of moral acquisition, they
might also be interpreted as supporting only that children
during the latency period are adroit at discerning what
behavior/responses adults expect and will reward regardless
of what the children actually think. They clearly indicate
the latency age child's deference to the adult. Piaget
says both objective and subjective responsibility are found
at all ages between 6 and 10 but that the latter predomin-
ates as the child develops (Piaget, 1965)
.
B . Psychoanalytic Theory
Freud
Freud viewed the human personality as triparite,
divided into the id, ego and superego. The id is seen as
the source of all drives and the reservoir of instincts.
Freud proposed sexuality and aggression as the basic
instincts. Although instinctual drives represent biolog-
ical givens they are susceptible to cultural influences.
The ego is the conscious state which mediates between the
14
unconscious impulses of the id and the superego. The
superego is the part of personality which deals with moral
and social values. It is the internal representation of
parents which arises after the resolution of the Oedipus
Complex at about five or six years of age. The superego
is formed by the child's identification with the same sex
parent to reduce anxiety from instinctual love of the
opposite sex parent. It is through the superego that
society's values are inculcated in the child. In Freud's
view the function of society is to teach humans to regulate
their destructive instincts. He believed society rests on
restraint and force of necessity because the individual's
desires are often opposed to the interest of society.
Psychoanalytic theory values the family as the core
social structure. The prevalence of love or hate within
the family is seen to determine whether the child's super-
ego, the moral and ideal standards, will develop in socially
acceptable ways. Moral failure in psychoanalytic theory
is seen as character faults tied to faults in family
structure (Gilligan, 1980).
Freud's superego corresponds to Piaget's pre-convent-
ional level morality which Piaget characterizes as the
uncritical acceptance of external standards imposed by the
adult. Internalized parent prohibitions are sufficient
closed, traditional society. Thismoral guides only in a
15
preconventional moral judgment was found in eighty-eight
percent of English and American juvenile delinquents
studied by Freundlick and Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1978).
Kohlberg equates superego morality only with Stage 1, the
lowest in his six stage hierarchy of moral development
(Kohlberg, 1969) .
C. Humanistic Theory
Humanism finds expression in the actualization-fulfill-
ment theories of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow. The person
is seen as inherently good. What is best for the person to
be and to do is what arises by virtue of his or her unique
individuality. The inherent potential of each person con-
tains nothing which is dangerous to the self or society
according to Rogers (1961)
.
Humanistic theories differ from other theories in
their emphasis on self-concept, inner states and in their
optimistic view of humans and the human experience. They
maintain that an inherent growth process will lead to
genuine morality if the child's basic needs are not
thwarted.
Moral failure from a humanistic perspective is the
failure of society to provide the conditions of acceptance,
respect and unconditional positive regard.
All agree on the detrimental effects of too little
love and deprivation of basic needs. Whiting and Child
16
(1953) concluded from their studies of parental discipline
and the formation of the child's self-control that,
"optimum moral development is produced by conditional
rather than unconditional positive regard" (cited in
Berkowitz, 1964, p. 76).
A frequent criticism of humanistic theories and
methods is that they foster ethical relativism. "If
everyone is ultimately right about everything, then
morality is a matter of opinions and feelings." (Stewart,
1975) . Moral relativism is seen by many as the antithesis
of morality. The claim of principled morality is that it
defines the right for anyone in any situation. The univ-
erality of moral principles is their empirical proof
(Morgenbesser
,
1974)
.
Humanism is often interpreted to mean that each is a
moral law unto himself or that all values have equal merit
and worth if they are self chosen. This researcher inter-
prets Rogers to mean that under the conditions of accept-
ance, respect and unconditional positive regard each human
would arrive at the same universal moral principles
elaborated by ancient and modern moral philosphers. In a
less than perfect world it is the researcher's belief that
direct moral education is necessary to offset the dangers
inherent in a humanism based on the absolute supremacy of
individual moral judgment, or in a social learning theory
17
which totally absolves the individual from personal res-
ponsibility for moral choice and moral action.
D. Cognitive-Developmental Theory
While psychoanalytic theory stresses that moral devel-
opment results from the renunciation of instinctual pleas-
ure cognitive-developmental theory believes "moral develop-
ment is formed by the Socratic belief that to know the good
is to love the good, and that in choosing the good, one
chooses happiness" (Gilligan, 1980)
.
Piaget
Piaget (1965) describes the process of moral maturat-
ion as an evolution of moral judgment. It is now axiomatic
that moral judgment changes as children grow older. Accord-
ing to Piaget, children begin with a morality of constraint
which is based on external authority and rigid interpretat-
ion of rules and pass to a morality of cooperation with
judgments based on social considerations and flexible
interpretations of rules. Changes in attitudes toward
rules reflect changes in children's cognitive structures
and changes in their social interactions.
Piaget says the essence of morality is the conscious-
ness of obligation to a system of rules. Children progress
from thought of rules as external and unchanging regulat-
ions imposed by adults, MORAL REALISM, to realization that
rules are created by consenting equals and mutable, MORAL
18
RELATIVISM. During the period of moral realism, children
judge the morality of an act in terms of its consequences.
When children reach the stage of moral relativism, they are
capable of evaluating the intent of the action. The rules
always impose some restraints upon children but the reasons
for accepting the limitations change as children develop.
The factors which affect the growth of moral develop-
ment are the concurrent changes in cognitive structures and
social relationships. Preoperational children (two to
seven years of age) make judgments based on concrete per-
ceptual information. Children in the operational stage of
cognitive development (seven to twelve years of age)
experience awareness of other points of view from their
ability to see an event from more than one perspective and
their role-taking ability.
Piaget's stages of cognitive development provides the
framework for developmental changes in moral judgment. He
holds them to be of the same invariant sequence. During
the sensorimotor stage (0 to 2 years) children act at the
dictates of motor habits and desires. During the ego-
centric stage (2-4 years) children's environments are
experienced as extensions of the self and no clear dis-
tinctions are made between subjective and objective
phenomena. Children hear authority as expressing their
own will or they react to it contrarily. The ability to
19
cooperate is completely absent at this stage. Both con-
formity and non-conformity are ego-centric. Piaget defines
ego-centrism as the confusion of the ego and the external
world. Young children are capable of compliance as well
as resistance to goal blocking. They can express anger
and frustration but they still are not capable of the
intent necessary for moral action because they cannot
conceptualize intentions accurately.
During the authoritarian stage (roughly 3 or 4 to 7
years) children's morality is a morality of constraint .
The sense of right and wrong is based on dependency and
submission to authority figures. Things are moral in
relation to the rules. Rules are imposed by the adult.
Children's moral values, like the rules, are seen to
originate outside of themselves. Whether they obey or
disobey, the rightness of an adult rule or command is not
questioned. Any disobedience is wrong at this stage.
Intention is not considered only the final outcome or
consequence is considered in making judgments.
Young children may be able to discriminate between
intentional and unintentional in their own behavior but
their ego-centricity prevents them from taking another's
perspective. Another's behavior is judged by outcomes.
This Piaget terms an "objective conception" of responsibil-
ity. The amount of damage determines the gravity of the
20
behavior rather than the intention. Good is rigidly de-
fined as obedience; it demands that the letter rather than
the spirit of the law be observed; it induces an objective
responsibility
.
Piaget found that theoretical lags behind practical
moral judgment because verbal thinking has to reconstruct
symbolically and on a new plane, operations (schemas) which
have already taken place in action. He believed that if
children had witnessed scenes described to them their moral
judgments would be different because in real life children
are in the presence of not isolated facts but of personal-
ities which attract or repel them as global wholes. Here
they allow, more or less justly, for aggravating or atten-
uating circumstances. They grasp people's intentions by
direct intuition and cannot abstract from them (p. 120) .
Piaget found that no child is wholly operating in a
state of moral realism. Subjective responsibility is
always mixed in (p. 155) . Piaget explains moral realism
beyond cognitive structure when he says some adults
apportion blame or punishment according to the amount of
damage done. It is not only the adult's commands which
young children internalize but also the adult's example.
Most children cannot make the distinction between the
adults 's scolding about material damages from a clumsy
act and a moral fault. In spite of the adult's intentions
21
the objective responsibility imposes itself on the child's
mind.
The next level of moral development Piaget designates
as morality of cooperation or moral relativism. Piaget
believed that the notion of justice which arises from the
development of mutual respect and solidarity which child-
ren hold among themselves leads to moral autonomy. It is
embedded in the voluntary acceptance of the group norms.
Piaget states that notions of justice and solidarity devel-
op correlatively and as a funtion of the mental age of the
child. This period coincides with operational thought.
Operational children are limited to reasoning about events
in their immediate or past experience. Their cognitive
structures now permit them to see events from more than
one perspective and this role-taking ability allows them
to evaluate an action by its intention. Moral judgments
are increasingly based on motive. The concept of justice
changes from punitive to restitutive.
Younger children measure the gravity of a lie not by
its motives but in terms of the falseness of its statement
just as they judge actions by material results. This
diminishes as children grow older. Children between five
and seven years do not distinguish between error and deceit,
to them all false statements are "lies". Around eight
years the distinction between a mistake and a lie is
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generally understood. It was not until age ten to eleven
years that Piaget's subjects defined a lie as an intention-
ally false statement intended to deceive.
For Piaget adolescents have the potential for mature,
autonomous moral judgments because formal operational
thought enables them to hypothesize, critize their own
thinking and conceptualize ideals of social justice and
aesthetics. These cognitive structure changes appear
around age 12 years (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969)
.
A child's theoretical morality is subject to either
the principles of unilaterial respect and objective
responsibility or it is based on mutual respect and sub-
jective responsibility. Piaget reminds the reader fre-
quently that theoretical judgment is not necessarily
practiced in real life at any level. His belief is that a
given level of cognitive functioning is a necessary but
not sufficient determinant of moral judgment.
Piaget's theory of genetic psychology holds that the
tendency toward rational development is innate but must
be developed through a child's interactions with his
surroundings. Although his major contribution is the
structual analysis of cognitive processes, his views about
the roles of social learning, identification, parent
and
family influences on the moral development of children
are
in harmony with other theorists.
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Piaget believed in a biological tendency toward both
the satisfaction of egocentric demands and a desire for
approval and affection. This transcends the innately evil
position of Freud's psychoanalytic origins of conscience
and the humanist's innately good corrupted by society,
position while accomodating both.
Research critical of Piaget's findings is usually
directed at his specific age categories (Beard, 1963;
Wellman, Larkey and Somerville, 1979) . The latter study
indicates children as young as four and five years old
understand intent, restitution, reciprocity and act accord-
ingly. The research was carried out at the applied level
with perceptual clues rather than on the exclusively verbal
and theoretical plane Piaget used. Piaget maintained that
the theoretical lags behind the practical as cited earlier.
Bandura and McDonald (1963) claim the sequence of
developmental changes is primarily a function of changes in
reinforcement contingencies and other learning variables
rather than the unfolding of genetically programmed
response predispositions. Their experiments showed that
children's observations of models and reinforcements
effected their moral judgments. Again, experimental
conditions changed the plane from theoretical to practical
(concrete perceptual) with the observation of models.
Piaget’s discussion of parent and peer influences indicates
of the role of social learning in moralhis acceptance
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development
.
Some critics have said that Fiaget generalizes too
broadly, ignoring cultural and socioeconomic differences
(Bronfenbrenner, 1972; Berkowitz, 1964). Piaget's
observations about differences in parent attitudes
,
practices
and the impact of parental moral realism on children's
moral judgments as well as his statement that children's
rate of progress may vary from one culture to another
suggest that he was aware of these differences.
Kay (1970) interprets Piaget to mean that empathy and
a sense of reciprocity develop from peer interactions. As
peer influence gains ascendency in children's lives coop-
eration increases as the basis for social interaction and
the influence of adult constraints decreases (Kay, 1970).
Piaget says that cooperation and reciprocity develop
from mutual respect which he says many children "unfortunat-
ely", encounter only in peer interaction because the maj-
ority of parents are poor psychologists, perpetuating moral
realism in their children by adult constraint (Piaget, 1965,
p. 193) .
Parents who try to give their children a moral educat-
ion based on intention achieve very early results as shown
by the few examples Piaget found of subjective responses by
some six and seven year olds. Rules imposed by adults
either verbally (do not steal, do not spill milk) or
materially (anger or punishment) constitute obligations for
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children whether or not children put them into practice.
"There is no doubt that by adopting a certain technique
with their children, parents can succeed in making them
attach more importance to intentions than to rules conceived
as a system of ritual interdictions" (p. 137).
Kohlberg
In his own words, Kohlberg described his cognitive-
developmental theory on moral development as a re-definition
and validation of the Dewey-Piaget levels and stages
(Kohlberg, 1975). Dewey postulated three levels of moral
development: 1) pre-moral or pre-conventional , behavior
motivated by biological and/or social impulses; 2) conven-
tional, behavior which accepts group standards without
critical reflection; 3) autonomous, behavior which is
guided by individual thinking and reflections upon right-
ness or wrongness despite group standards. Piaget defined
these stages as: 1) pre-moral, where there is a sense of
obligation to rules; 2) heteronomous , where right is the
literal obedience of rules because they represent authority
and power; 3) autonomous, where following rules is
recognied as voluntary and based on reciprocity and
equality (See Table 1)
.
From longitudinal studies and interviews with
children of all ages and backgrounds as they explained
their judgments about hypothetical moral dilemmas. Kohlberg
elaborated six stages of moral development (See Table 1)
.
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Table 1
Levels and Stages of Moral Development
Piaget Level Kohlberg Stage
I. Premoral level 1. punishment and obedience
orientation
2. Naive instrumental hedonism
II. Morality of convent-
ional role conformity
3. Good boy morality of main-
taining good relations,
approval of others
4. Authority maintaining
morality
III. Morality of self-
accepted moral
principles
5. Morality of contract and
of democratically accepted
law
6
.
Morality of individual
principles of conscience
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Longitudinal and crosscultural studies showed that 50
percent of an individual's thinking is always at one stage,
with the remainder in the next adjacent stage, either one
below which he or she is leaving or one above, which he or
she is entering (Kohlberg, 1975)
.
The invariant sequence of stages was demonstrated
(Kohlberg and Elfenbein, 1975)
,
by retests at three year
intervals which indicate individuals had either remained
at the same stage or advanced to a higher stage.
Hierarchical integration has been demonstrated (Rest,
Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969) by adolescents who expressed
comprehension of all stages lower than their own but failed
to understand moral judgments more than one stage above
their own.
Kohlberg' s research found that moral judgments do not
correlate highly with IQ or verbal intelligence. Age cor-
relates better with maturity of moral judgment than IQ does.
A certain level of cognitive maturity is necessary for a
given level of moral judgment, but, it does not assure it.
A person's logical stage puts a certain ceiling on the
moral stage he or she can attain. Most individuals are
higher in logical stage than they are in moral stage. This
appears to be in conflict with Piaget who stated that in
young children at least, theoretical moral reasoning lags
behind practical experience and action (Piaget, 1965)
.
28
According to Kohlberg (1975)
,
while over 50 percent of late
adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning,
only ten percent of adults in the formal operations stage
of logical thinking displayed principled moral reasoning.
Just as logical reasoning is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for mature moral judgment, mature
moral judgment is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for mature moral action (Kreb and Kohlberg, 1973) . It was
found that moral judgment is the most influential but not
the only factor in moral behavior. The stage of moral
judgment in theoretical situations is irreversible while
moral behavior is reversible because of situational factors
and emotional presses. However, according to the moral
development theory of Kohlberg (1958, 1963) as an individ-
ual attains higher levels of moral reasoning there is
greater congruence between reasoning and behavior.
Kohlberg' s cognitive- developmental approach to moral
growth claims that ethical principles are distinguishable
from arbitrary conventional rules and customs and that
awareness of these principles is the final stage of an
invariant developmental sequence.
Moral principles are considered ultimately as
principles of justice. Moral conflicts are seen as
conflicts between competing claims for justice. Convent-
ional morality defines good behavior within a given
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culture. Decisions based on universal principles are
those on which all moral humans could agree. Decisions
based on conventional moral rules are subject to dis-
agreement as cultures and social roles conflict.
In the cognitive-developmental view, morality is the
natural outcome of a universal human tendency toward
empathy and concern for justice, reciprocity or equality
in human relationships.
The stages of moral development appear to be cul-
turally universal. Kohlberg has studies Western as well
as non-Western cultures and the basic ways of moral valu-
ing were found in each culture and developed in the same
order (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) . Implied by these
findings is that basic moral principles are independent
of specific religious doctrines. No differences in the
development of moral thinking were found between atheists
and believers, Christians, Moslems, Jews or Buddhists.
The data collected do not indicate that all values are
universal but that basic moral values are universal.
Two assumptions of cognitive-developmental theory
are: 1) moral development has a cognitive core; 2) moral
education or socialization does not transmit fixed moral
values but stimulates children's restructuring of their
own experience. Movement to the next higher stage involves
internal reorganization rather than mere learning of
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additional content.
Moral principles are not external rules that have
been internalized nor are they natural tendencies of the
biological organism. They are the emergents of social
interaction ( Developmental Psychology Today
,
1971) . Blatt
and Kohlberg (1975) developed a Socratic Method for moral-
stage change. Intentional induction of cognitive conflict
rather than passive exposure to higher moral thought was
found to advance children to a higher stage of moral
reasoning.
The educational method to advance moral reasoning to
higher levels is the use of moral discussion to:
1. expose the student to the next higher stage of
reasoning
2. expose the student to situations, posing problems
and contradictions with the student's current
moral structure, leading to dissatisfaction with
the current level
3. to create an atmosphere of open exchange and
dialogue to compare conflicting moral views.
Blatt found that the range of stages within a class-
room can be as high as three. The teacher first supported
and clarified those arguments which were one stage above
the lowest stage among the children. When it seemed that
there arguments were understood by the students, the
teacher challenged that stage and so on. At the end of the
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semester experimental groups showed a gain of one stage
for one-quarter to one-half of the students while control
groups showed no change. Evidence indicated that moral
discussion could raise moral reasoning stage (Blatt and
Kohlberg, 1969)
.
The moral atmosphere which fosters moral development
is one which encourages role taking and provides opportunit-
ies to take the other's point of view. This is related to
social interaction and communication and the child's sense
of efficacy in influencing the attitudes of others. Another
condition of the social atmosphere is the level of justice
in the environment, the perceived way rewards and punish-
ments are distributed, rules and privileges imposed.
Kohlberg and Blatt theorizes that in a "just community"
where real-life moral situations are discussed as issues of
fairness and as matters for democratic decision, students
will be stimulated to advance in both moral reasoning and
moral action. A participatory democracy provides more role
taking opportunities than does any other social arrangement.
The sense of community improves morale and seems to lead
to positive behavior change. Blatt and Kohlberg see this
"just community" as based in the school or kibbutz (Reimer,
1977) . There is no reason that the same atmosphere and
conditions cannot be achieved within the family.
Parent Role in the Moral Development of Children
Research on the role of parents in the moral develop
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ment of their children is generally observational and
descriptive with results reported in correlations. In the
Hartshorne and May (1928) studies specific character traits
were examined in an experimental setting and found to be
inconsistent. Other research has found that while discreet
behaviors are not stable, the organization of behavior
is (Block, 1975)
.
Parental affection or nuturance is iirportant if
children are to learn moral values (Hoffman, 1970a; Sears,
Maccoby and Levin, 1957; Coopersmith, 1967).
Many investigators have reported the importance of
parental reasoning with the child (Sears, et al, 1957;
Baumrind, 1967; 1971; Aronfreed, 1968). Hoffman (1970a)
proposed that induction, the parent pointing out the
consequences of the child's behavior to others, is the
most important antecedent to internalizing values and
corresponding behaviors. Parents who reason with their
children and use other-orientated induction communicate
the importance of the welfare of others. Piaget (1965)
refers to the parents' role in developing the child's
awareness of intentionality versus material consequences
in moral reasoning as a function of the parent's verbal
communications with the child. Hoffman (1963) found that
the relationship between parent's induction and children's
socially responsible behavior was correlated with low
power assertion by parents. According to Hoffman
(1970a)
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induction can elicit empathy in the child and communicate
to the child that he or she has a responsibility to others.
It seems evident that parental induction will facilitate
the child's role-taking ability which Piaget (1965) says
is a major factor in the development of moral reasoning.
In Coopersmith's study the boys with a high degree of
self-esteem were successful socially. They led rather than
merely listened to discussions. They were eager to express
opinions and did not sidestep disagreements. They were
not particularly sensitive to criticism and were highly
interested in public affairs. Coopersmith ' s (196© findings
suggest that the ability to participate in and lead
Kohlberg-type moral reasoning discussions in school has its
antecedents in the home life and family structure of the
student rather than in the classroom atmosphere (Kohlberg,
1978). The "just community" concept (Power and Reimer,
1978) may be viewed as an effort to replicate in the
school, kibbutz or prison the conditions Coopersmith
described as the well-structured family environment.
Both Coopersmith (1968) and Baumrind (1975) reported
that parents of the children with positive socialization
set high standards and explicit behavior expectations for
their children. Baumrind (1971) reported that authoritative
parents had clear ideas about how they wanted their
children to behave. In an analysis of parental control
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and guidance procedures, Loevinger (1959) says that a
basic theory or philosophy is required for the parent to
unite and modify strategies over time as the child grows
and matures. This consistency over time communicates
to the child that reason not impulse supports the parent's
value system.
A child's home life plays a major role in his select-
ion of friends. If his family ties are strong and affect-
ionate, they become a "bulwark against antisocial influences
from neighborhood or peer groups" (Berkowitz, 1964, p. 71).
The self-selection of peer associates and its relationship
to the parent-child relationship and parent-style variables
is of particular significance when considering Piaget's
emphasis on the role of peer interactions in the moral
development of the child (Piaget, 1965)
.
Numerous research studies have been made relating
parent practices to moral development in children (Hoffman,
1970; 1975; Montemayor, 1977; Gutkin, 1975; Roke , 1980).
Some of the research findings are contradictory. Hoffman
and Saltzstein (1967) found in a middle class sample that
power assertion by the mother was related to weak moral
development in the child. The use of induction by the
mother was consistently related to advanced moral develop
ment. Few significant findings were obtained for fathers
(Holstein, 1969)
.
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Montemayor (1977) examined the relationship between
parent's use of person-oriented discipline versus position-
oriented discipline and the moral judgments of second grade
students. The use of person-oriented discipline character-
ized by an emphasis on their children's needs and intent-
ions by mothers was significantly related to the use of
moral intentionality in their children. No relationship
was found between the father's orientation and the moral
judgments of their children.
Two parent practices which were noted in all studies
as correlates to the positive moral development of children
were affection and discipline. Hoffman and Saltzstein
(1967) found parental affection had a positive correlation.
The findings for affection were based on the children's
reports. The children with advanced moral development
perceived their parents as approving, affectionate, advis-
ing and participating in child-centered activities (See
Table 2)
.
Induction regarding the parent meant appeals to the
child's potential for guilt by expressing hurt or disappoint-
ment by the parent as consequences of the child's behavior.
Induction regarding peers meant pointing out to the child
the consequences of his or her behavior in terms of the
other child's feelings.
A pattern of affection with infrequent use of power
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Table 2
Correlates of Parent Practices and the Moral Development of
Their Children
Positive Negative
1. Affection
warir.th and nurturance
sensitivity and resonsiveness
interest in the child's welfare
acceptance
II. Discipline
low power assertion Power assertion
high standards and
expectations
love withdrawal
induction-consequences of
child's behavior
consistent, firm enforcement
of rules
III. Communication
accessible
listening
reasoning
explanations for demands
democratic decision making
harsh punishment
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assertion and frequent use of induction facilitated the
facets of morality included in this study, internal moral
judgment, acceptance of responsibility, consideration of
other children.
The af fective/cognitive considerations of the
discipline techniques are presented in a theoretical
discussion by Hoffman and Saltzstein. Power-assertion is
seen as arousing intense anger in the child. The disci-
plinary action of the parent provides the model for the
child to imitate in the discharge of anger. Both love
withdrawal and power assertion direct the child's attention
to the consequences of the behavior for the child and to
the external agent producing the consequences. Induction,
on the other hand, focuses the child's attention on the
consequences of the child's behavior on others. This
distinction is considered important in determining the
content of the child's standards. Implied in induction is
the means of reparation. Induction is seen as a method
most capable of enlisting the child's natural tendency for
empathy. Hoffman and Saltzstein believe the coalescence of
empathy and the awareness of being the causal agent should
produce a social conscience.
Their analysis of the data indicates that power
assertion is least effective in promoting the
development
of moral standards and internalization of controls
because
it elicits anger in the child and provides a
model for
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expressing hostility. It serves to inhibit feelings of
empathy. It promotes expectations of punitive responses
from adult authorities and thereby contributes to an
external moral orientation.
Induction is the most facilitative form of discipline
for building long term controls which are independent of
external sanctions.
Parent Group Education Program
Published parent education programs were reviewed to
find out whether they have ever been used as possible
vehicles for preparing parents to facilitate the moral
development of their children according to the principles
of cognitive-development theory. None was found to give
parents an understanding of the developmental processes
nor the uses of induction either to stimulate cognitive
growth or as a discipline technique to develop empathy and
inner control independent of external sanctions.
A. Systematic Training for Effective Parenting
Systematic Training for Effective Parenting (Dinkmeyer
and McKay
,
1976) is based on psychoanalytic theory and the
philosophy of Alfred Adler. STEP advocates change from
authoritarian methods of child rearing to democratic
methods which will foster self-esteem, self-sufficiency,
responsibility, cooperation and social interest in the
child. Parents are instructed in the purposes of the
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child's misbehaviors as bids for attention, power, revenge,
or displays of inadequacy. By understanding the purpose of
the child's misbehaviors the parent is "freed from guilt"
and helped to function more effectively.
The discipline method recommended by STEP is the use
of natural and logical consequences of the child's behavior
The reward and punishment method of parental control is
considered outmoded. Punishment is seen to build rebellion
resentment, fear or guilt.
While STEP says its purpose is to develop responsibil-
ity and social concern in the child the issues discussed
in the programs are all child management problems revolv-
ing around bedtime struggles, promptness for meals, home-
work, etc. Examples of logical and natural consequences
are those which Kay (1970) says are characteristic of
the prudential morality of the preconvent ional child.
Rather than promote empathy and social responsibility, as
exemplified in STEP, they encourage an egocentric not a
sociocentric morality. Cooperation is self-serving, not
other oriented.
B. Parents are Teachers
Becker in Parents Are Teachers (1971) combines
behavior modification techniques with an introduction of
rules and then reasons for the rules after desired
behaviors are established. The parent is not taught
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cognitive-developmental principles. No lose of induction
is ever suggested. While rules and the reasons for the
rules are taught to the child, external rewards and
sanctions are the regulators of behavior. It is considered
the parents' moral duty to direct the child to socially
approved behaviors. This orientation would place parents
at Kohlberg's Stage 3 (See Table 1).
C. Parent Effectiveness Training
Parent Effectiveness Training (Gordon, 1980) like the
humanistic program of Ginott (1965) stresses the affective
quality of the parent-child relationship. Although both
promote the accepting "moral atmosphere", direct cognitive
stimulation to advance moral judgment would be considered
as judgmental and undemocratic as direct guidance and
setting high standards. Research findings show that
advanced moral development in children correlates with
parent practices of affection, guidance and discipline
(See Table 2)
.
All of the above programs improve the "moral
atmosphere" but having created an atmosphere which is
conducive to moral development, the essentials of
induction, empathy, role-taking, intentionality and moral
discussion are omitted (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975; Piaget,
1965; Hoffman, 1970).
Moral Education Interventions
Recent research on moral education has been divided
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into three major groups according to the kind of inter-
vention used. The catagories are direct moral discussion
of real life situations in natural groups; direct moral
discussion and deliberate psychological education; and
direct moral education in social studies curricula. The
research results indicate interventions using natural
groups, parent-child and/or elementary classroom groups
and teacher, showed the most moral judgment change
(Higgins
,
19 80) .
School Settings
Rundle (1977) cotaught fifth grade students in a
twelve week program totaling 29 hours. In group one
dilemmas discussed were real classroom dilemmas in a
democractic setting; in group two hypothetical dilemmas
were discussed; the control group received no direct
moral education. The group discussing real classroom
dilemmas made stage advance while the other groups showed
no change as measured by the Moral Maturity Scale (MMS)
.
A study by Plymale (1977) found that adult rather than
peer leadership of group discussions was more effective in
advancing the moral reasoning of elementary students.
Studying 120 middle class boys in New York City
Public Schools aged 4-11 years Blotner (1981) found that
hypothetical moral reasoning was a predictor of helping.
Hypothetical moral reasoning was more advanced than pract-
ical moral reasoning. This study indicated moral reasoning
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is a better predictor of altruistic behavior than age,
cognitive perspective coordination or recursive role
taking. Certain types of moral reasoning were highly
consistent with moral behavior.
Schleifer and Douglas (1973) found that at all age
levels from 3 to 6 years training had a significant effect
in changing the moral orientation of children. The effects
of a 30 minute training program proved to last over long
periods of time and to generalize to different stimulus
materials. Smedslund (1961) says it is duration over time
which is the main criterion of whether real change in
cognitive structure has taken place.
A study by Jensen and Chatterley (1977) demonstrated
with kindergarten and first grade children that mature
modes of moral thinking need not be identified or rein-
forced, only presented and the child will spontaneously
prefer the more mature concepts in an atmosphere of mutual
respect where cognitive disequilibrium is fostered to
promote moral growth and teachers refrained from moraliz-
ing .
Parent-Child Intervention
Holstein (1969) investigated 53 middle class families
and their 8th grade children in family discussions of moral
dilemmas. Parents who encouraged children to participate
in discussions of moral issues had children who were higher
in moral development. In her research Holstein found that
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the child advances in moral reasoning when the parents
stimulate the child's own cognitive resources. She found
a very significant relationship between the mother's level
of moral development and the child's.
A study of the effects of parent training on the moral
development of five, six and seven year olds (Federko,
1977) used Piagetian dilemmas. Mothers were trained to
work with their children at home. Results showed that in a
two week period children trained one to one by parent or
teacher advanced from objective to subjective responsibility
while the control group showed on change in attribution of
intent
.
Stanley (1976) and Azrak (1978) worked with adolescents
and parents. Stanley found that an adolescent-parent
group made moral stage advance while children whose parents
alone received training showed no advance. Azrak 's study
included parents only in a workshop. Their children made
a slight gain. Both studies were conducted in school
settings for ten weeks.
Grimes (1974) introduced the concepts and discussion
techniques of moral stage development to the mothers of 11
year olds. The experimental group of mothers and children
met for discussions with the experimenter in the school.
They wrote and enacted their own dilemmas toward the end
of the study. These children made significant gain
compared to the group discussing hypothetical dilemmas.
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The control group showed no stage change. Inclusion of the
mothers was presumed to ha.ve a powerful effect because
discussions could be extended into the natural setting of
the child's home and family.
Studies by Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) suggest that it
is easier to move from preconventional to conventional
moral reasoning at younger ages than in adolescence when
Stage 2 reasoning has become fixated. The research of
Stanley (1976) and Rundle (1977) supports this. Grimes
(1974) study indicates that a parent intervention using
cognitive-developmental strategies has significant
potential
.
The most dramatic gains were made where children
discussed real life dilemmas in a natural setting using
democratic methods, i.e., within a moral atmosphere.
Socratic discussion and probing questions are necessary
stimulators for moral growth (Higgins, 1980).
The present study is undertaken to explore this use
of Socratic dialogue using real life dilemmas in the
natural setting of the home in the natural group of the
parent and child when the child is beginning to develop
a social conscience, latency
.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
After a brief statement of the rationale and present-
ation of the hypotheses this chapter will describe the
research and the procedures undertaken for this study.
While research documents both the importance of the
parents' role in the moral development of their children
and of the use of induction to advance their moral develop-
ment, current parent education programs for young children
do not teach parents an understanding of cognitive-develop-
mental processes in moral development or how to use
induction.
This study investigated the effects of a short-term
parent training program in the application of the concepts
of cognitive-developmental theory and the use of inducation
on the moral reasoning of their latency age children.
Hypotheses
The following four hypotheses were investigated in
this study:
H : 1 There will be no significant difference between
the mean pretest and the mean posttest scores in moral
judgment of children whose parents are trained to make
direct intervention in their moral development using
induction and the concepts of cognitive-developmental
theory
.
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H:2 There will be no significant difference in the
gains between the mean pre and posttest score in moral
judgment of children whose parents participate in the
training program and the children whose parents do not
participate
.
H:3 The effects of a short-term parent training pro-
gram will not endure beyond the period of intervention and
a three month follow-up test will not indicate significant
changes over time.
H:4 There will be no significant differences between
the control and experimental groups' responses on pre, post
and follow-up test instruments due to the children's age,
sex and religious instruction.
Design of Study
This study was an experimental control group pre, post
and follow-up design. The group which volunteered to part-
icipate was randomly divided into two groups to which
experimental or control group status was assigned. The
design paradigm followed is presented below.
Subjects
The subjects for this study were mothers and children
who volunteered to participate from regular third grade
classes in the Dedham Public Schools. Public school
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children were chosen to eliminate the effects of formal
religious education on moral development. Neighborhood
schools to which no children were bussed were selected to
minimize any confounding socioeconomic and cultural diff-
erences which have been found to be influential in moral
development research (Bronfenbrenner
,
1962; Kohlberg, 1964).
The neighborhood school presupposes maximum opportunities
for peer interactions and the resulting possibilities of
peer learning.
Third grade students were the target population be-
cause their average age is expected to be between 8 and 9
years. Children at this age usually have reached the
cognitive stage of operational thought which occurs around
age 7 in the majority of children. With cognitive struct-
ures for operational thought, children are amenable to
reasoning, role-taking and empathy.
The parent population consisted of mothers. Research
has shown that moral knowledge in children is related to
the mother-child relationship (Hartshorne and May, 1927;
Holstein, 1969) . While it was assumed that mothers would
have more time and schedule flexibility to participate in
the study a primary consideration in proposing a short-
term program was the realization that many mothers in the
population work outside of the home and could not make the
time commitment that a longer program demands
.
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All the subjects in the study were white of low to
middle income.
Instruments
Piaget's dilemma stories from The Moral Judgment of
the Child (1965) were used for pre, post and follow-up
testing. Ten dilemmas were used in the pretest to measure
each of the following dimensions of moral judgment; intent-
ionality/consequences ; distributive justice; immanent jus-
tice; restitutive justice/expiatory punishment; authority/
equality. (See Appendix B-l) . Ten complimentary Piaget
dilemmas were used in the post and follow-up tests. (See
Appendices B-2 and B-3)
.
In the Bandura and McDonald (1963) study the Piaget
procedure of presenting paired dilemma stories was used in
the pretest to evaluate the operant level of moral judgment
and posttest to measure the effects of the treatment. The
stories were considered to be sufficiently well structured
so that a subject's identification of the naughtier story
character was virtually a "perfect predictor" of the
child's moral orientation for either objective or subject-
ive responsibility on the dimension of intentionality
versus material damage.
Using the same procedures Gutkin (1975) obtained high
interrater reliability, r= .86. Schleifer and Douglas
(1973) obtained an interrater reliability of r= .96.
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Fedorko (1977) using the same procedure with five,
six and seven year olds obtained a test retest reliability
coefficient of 0.96.
Using dilemma story presentations and the clinical
interview technique Damon (1977) obtained 83% agreement
between two independent raters on the positive justice
dimension in his research with elementary school children.
For this study the researcher trained two independent
raters to at least .95 interrater reliability on each test
instrument. Ratings were based on tape recorded interviews
of the children (See Appendix B-5)
.
The clinically-oriented interview technique was pre-
ferred for the purpose of this study instead of a standard-
ized interview procedure because the social world of the
child must be investigated on its own terms (Damon, 1977)
.
To test the limits of the child's social knowledge, the
investigatory tecnhique may be "impossible" to "standardizd'
(ibid) . The clinical method is a ncessary instrument in
the study of children's social versus cognitive or percept-
ual development.
Other research supports this method of evaluating the
moral judgment of children. Durkin (1961) in her invest-
igation of children's attitudes toward reciprocity found
that reasons given, by second, fifth and eighth grade
students for their responses in some instances altered the
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nature of the responses. It was found that responses
which are overtly identical can be essentially different
when analyzed by the reasons given for them.
Boehm (1962) investigating the development of con-
science in grade school children of different mental and
socioeconomic levels used the clinical interview method.
The investigator formulated each question on the basis of
the subject's response to the preceding question. Boehm
concluded that a uniform questionnaire could not be used to
pick up the child's exact meanings.
Investigating the sequentiality of developmental stag-
es in children's moral judgments Turiel (1966) found that
children rarely verbalize an underlying principle spontan-
eously. To discover the level of cognitive organization
and the integration of preceding modes of thought as dis-
tinguished from merely reinforced verbal discriminations
between two responses, an interview technique was nec-
essary .
The clinical interview questions used in this study
and samples of verbatim responses have been included to
provide guidelines for other researchers (See Appendix
B-4 ) .
The test instrument and treatment were selected to
minimize response set and practice effect.
The Damon Positive Justice Interview was considered
as a test instrument because it is the only instrument
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designed for the target population which has adequate
reliability and validity. However time constraints requir-
ed an instrument which tapped several dimensions of moral
judgment in one 30 minute testing session.
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) was used
with two children in the control group whose school records
did not indicate IQ range. Their PPVT scores of 98 and
106 were well within the average range.
Treatment
The treatment was comprised of the training of the
mothers. Four one hour training sessions were held to
train the mothers to present the moral conflict dilemmas,
to ask probing questions and to stimulate cognitive con-
flict by introducing a higher level of reasoning to the
child through the use of induction.
At the first training meeting an overview of cognitive
developmental theory based on the discussion of the works
of Piaget and Kohlberg found in Chapters I and II of this
paper was given. The role of the parent in the moral
development of the child was reviewed and an overview of
the latency period drawn from Ilg, Ames and Baker (1981)
,
Druska and Whelan (1975) and Elkin (1970) was given. Ample
time was allowed for questions and discussions. (See
Appendix D)
.
The 2nd, 3rd and 4th training sessions for the mothers
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followed a workshop format. Mothers practiced using the
Socratic Method, role-taking, rephrasing the child's res-
ponse, recognizing the response level and suggesting one
at the next higher level. Each session was followed by a
question and discussion period. (See Appendices E through
G) .
The parents met once a week following the above format
until the end of the study for a total of four training
sessions. All parent training sessions were tape recorded.
The mothers were asked to train the children at home. The
mothers were asked to give a minimum of, but not limited
to, 15 to 20 minutes a day, each day, for four weeks to
presenting to the experimental child a Kohlberg-type dil-
emma designed for primary age children by Brady (See
Appendices D-9 and D-ll) . The mothers were tained to ask
probing questions, introduce questions of empathy and role-
taking. They were trained to present reasoning one level
above the child's response to the dilemma. (See Appendix
D-4) . They were also trained to encourage the child to
formulate and discuss real life dilemmas
.
Procedures
Pilot Study : The test instrument was used with three
third grade students from another school district to det
ermine the length of administration time and whether
questions gave clear differentiation of reasoning levels
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for American children in the 8 to 9 year age group.
It was found that the entire test instrument can be
administered within 20 to 30 minutes depending upon the
degree of elaboration of the child. All story items were
understood. In the cases of the pilot study subjects,
answers were clearly scorable as considering intention or
not; distributing equally or with equity; punishment was
punitive or restitutive and adult authority was superior
to claims of fairness or not. Probe questions were nec-
essary at times to eliminate ambiguity. It was decided
on the basis of the pilot study results to add a score for
advanced moral judgment.
The parent program was reviewed by four third grade
mothers. They expressed enthusiasm and interest. Each
asked if she might join the poststudy program. They con-
sidered the Brady stories, with vocabulary modifications,
appropriate to their children's experience and attention
spans
.
After obtaining permission from the superintendent of
schools and the school principals, a meeting was scheduled
with each principal and the third grade teachers to explain
the nature of the study and to ask for their cooperation.
A letter was sent to the parents of each third grade
student inviting the mother and the child to participate in
the study. A cover letter from the principal introducing
the researcher accompanied the letter of invitation and
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expressed the hope that the mother and child would be able
to participate. (See Appendix A).
Because of declining enrollments and the necessity of
obtaining an adequate number of mothers to participate,
invitations were sent to the third grade parents of two
schools. The parent-trainer groups were composed of mothers
from both schools. The daytime sessions were conducted at
the Avery School. The evening sessions were conducted in
a meeting room of the Endicott Branch of the Dedham Public
Library which was centrally located for the mothers.
All the third grade students whose mothers volunteered
to participate in the study were pretested (See Appendix
B-l) . The experimenter both tape recorded and wrote res-
ponses on a score sheet. Pretest protocols were scored by
the experimenter arid reviewed by two independent raters.
Scoring was according to the scoring procedures of
Bandura and McDonald (1963), Schleifer and Douglas (1973)
and Fedorko (1977). Each objective answer was scored 0.
Each subjective answer was scored 1. Advanced answers,
those indicating equity or autonomous judgment were scored
2. (See Appendix B-4)
.
From the volunteer group thirty children were random-
ly selected. From this group fifteen were randomly assign-
ed to the experimental group and the remaining fifteen
were designated the control group.
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Interrater Training Procedures
All subjects were pre, post and follow-up tested
individually by the researcher. Each interview was tape
recorded on a Panasonic tape recorder. The subjects spoke
into a Realistic Tip Clip Mike (Cat. No. 33-1058) from.
Radio Shack.
Two master teachers agreed to serve as independent
raters. The scoring criteria was explained to them in a
joint session. Each rater listened to two taped inter-
views, and recorded the subjects responses on score sheets.
They then scored the protocols according to the scoring
criteria (See Appendix B-4) under the researchers super-
vision until agreement reached 85%.
All pre, post and test interviews had been scored
previously by the researcher. Raters were given randomly
assigned tapes, five each of the pre and post test inter-
views which they were asked to transcribe and score indep-
endently. Scoring was blind. Raters did not know which
were control subjects or how the researcher had scored
their responses. Examples of other subjects responses and
scores were not available to the interraters. The tapes
and the independent ratings were returned to the researcher.
Interrater reliability on the pre test was .95. Inter-
rater reliability on the post test was .976. The same
procedure was used for the follow-up test scoring. Scoring
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five protocols interrater reliability on the follow-up test
was .95.
Parents who volunteered and were assigned to the
control group were offered the parent training program
after the study was completed. Following the four week
training/treatment period all the children were posttested
after a one week time lapse.
The posttest was an alternate form of the pretest.
(See Appendix B-2)
.
Administration and scoring procedures
were the same as the pretest. The posttest was administer-
ed by the experimenter. Responses were tape recorded and
written on the score sheet verbatim. Posttests were scored
by the experimenter and reviewed by two independent raters.
The follow-up test was administered three months later to
all the children in the experimental and control groups
following the same procedures as the posttest. (See Append-
ix B-3) .
Table 3 contains a step by step account of the pro-
cedures followed in this study
.
Table 3
Summary of Procedures
Step 1. Pilot test.
Step 2. Permission of the School Department
Step 3. Letters of invitation to parents
Step 4. Pretest of children
Step 5. Random Assignment to experimental or
control
group
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Step 6.
Step 7.
Step 8.
Step 9.
Step 10.
Step 11.
Orientation meeting with mothers
Training and Treatment period
Posttest of children
Interrater training and review
Follow-up testing of children three months later
Parent training program for control group mothers
CHAPTER IV
Analysis of the Data
Analysis of the data will be presented in this
chapter. Each hypothesis will be examined in order. A
discussion of the findings, conclusions and implications
will be presented in Chapter V.
The purpose of this study was to determine if a short-
term parent training program in the use of induction and
the concepts of cognitive-developmental theory of moral
development could advance the moral reasoning level of
latency age children as measured with alternatre forms of
a test designed from Piaget's dilemma stories.
Description of the Children and their Mothers
The subjects were 30 third grade children from similar
racial and socioeconomic backgrounds in New England whose
parents volunteered to participate in a moral education
training program conducted by the researcher. After the
children were pretested they were randomly assigned to
experimental or control groups
.
The mean age for each student group was 8.10 years.
The age range for the experimental group was 15 months,
from 8.4 years to 9.7 years. The age range for the control
group was 16 months, from 8.4 years to 9.8 years. IQ
scores were not available. All of the children in both
groups were achieving in the average range or above
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according to teacher reports and academic achievement
records as measured by the Stanford Achievement Test (1973)
except two subjects. Each of these students was tested by
the researcher using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test.
Their PPVT scores placed them in the average IQ range.
The 30 mothers ranged in age from their late twenties
to their middle forties. Six were single parents. Nine
were employed full-time outside of the home, four were
employed part-time. One mother was a college graduate,
one a registered nurse and 3 mothers had taken some college
courses. The remaining mothers were all high school
graduates. Ten of the 15 experimental group mothers attend-
ed all sessions. Four mothers missed one session each.
One mother missed three sessions because of a family death.
The researcher telephoned each absent mother and explained
the session agenda. Packets of the session's handouts were
taken to absent mothers either by a neighbor mother or the
researcher
.
Interrater Reliability:
The children were tested in their schools, pre, post
and follow-up. The pretest interviews were not scored by
the researcher until after the completion of the parent
training program and the administration of the posttest.
Any bias in the researcher's scoring of the interview
protocols was controlled for by having independent raters
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who did not know the experimental status of the subjects.
The independent raters were asked to score only one protoc-
ol for a subject. Interrater reliability was not less than
.95 pre, post or follow-up.
Hypothesis One
H : 1 There will be no significant statistical diff-
erence between the mean pretest and posttest scores in
measured moral judgment of children whose parents are
trained to make direct intervention in their moral develop-
ment using induction and the concepts of cognitivie-devel-
opmental theory.
To test H : 1 a T-test for dependent means was used to
measure the level of statistical significance between the
pre and posttest means of the experimental group.
The t value of 2.510 is greater than the critical
value of 2.145 at 14 degrees of freedom therefore the null
H:1 is rejected at p (.05. These results indicate that
the children in experimental group show a gain in the
difference between their mean pretest score and their
mean posttest score which exceeds .05 level of significance.
The results of the T-test are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4
Significance of the Difference Between the Means of the
Pre and Posttest Scores of the Experimental Group
_ 2 level ofTest N X SD 0 df t-value significance
Pretest 15 8.06 1.48 2.19
14 2.510 p<.05*
Posttest 15 9.26 1.59 2.55
*p/.01 at critical value 2.977
p<.05 at critical value 2.145
As Table 4 indicates the mean increase in moral reas-
oning level of the experimental group from pretest to post-
test was 1.20 as measured by alternate forms of Piaget
dilemma stories. This change was statistically significant
t- (14)= 2.51, p<\ 05. Expressed in more qualitative terms,
66 2/3% of the experimental children advanced in their
moral reasoning level score.
Hypothesis Two
H : 2 There will be no significant statistical differ-
ence in the gains between pre and post mean scores in
measured moral judgment of children whose parents partic-
ipate in the training program and the children whose
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parents do not participate.
To test H:2 a T-test for dependent means was used to
determine the level of statistical significance between
the pre and posttest means of the control group.
It was anticipated that within the six week period
between the pretest and the posttest there would be no
significant difference between the pre and posttest means
of the control group children. Results of the T-test
supports this. The t value of 1.729 is less than the
critical value of 2.145 at 14 degrees of freedom. The
difference between the means pre and posttest of the
control group children does not reach the level of signifi-
cance. Results of the T-tests for significance of the
difference between the pre and posttest means of the control
group children are presented in Table 5.
Table 5
Significance of the Difference Between the Means of
the Pre and Posttest Scores of the Control Group
level of
Test N X SD 0 Z df t-value significance
Pretest 15 7.06 1.73 2.99
14 1.729 NS
Posttest 15 7.86 1.49 2.24
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As Tables 4 and 5 indicate the results of the T-tests
indicate the children whose parents participated in the
parent training program had gains between their pre and
posttest means which reached p .05 level of significance.
The children whose parents did not participate in the
training program did not have gains between the pre and
posttest means which reached a level of significance there-
fore the null H : 2 is rejected.
A T-test for independent means was used to measure
the statistical significance between the posttest means
of the experimental and the control groups. This yielded
a t value of 6.60. At 28 degrees of freedom the critical
value 2.763 reaches p .01 confidence level. The results
of this T-test support the rejection of the null H:2.
Each group showed some gain between their pre and
posttest means. The gain for the children whose parents
participated in the parent training program was statistic-
ally significant while the gain of the children whose
parents did not participate in the parent training program
was not statistically significant.
Although the T-tests establish that the difference
between the pre and posttest means of the experimental
and control groups has statistical significance, these
results do not necessarily indicate clinical or psycholog-
ical significance. The phychological significance of the
results will be discussed later in Chapter V.
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Hypothesis Three
H : 3 The effects of a short-term parent training
program will not endure beyond the period of intervention
and a three month follow-up test will not indicate signifi-
cant changes over time.
Preliminary to testing H:3 the means and standard
deviations of the follow-up test were computed for the
experimental and control groups. There were compared with
pre and posttest results and are presented in Table 6.
Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for Pre, Post and Follow-up
Tests of the Experimental and Control Groups
Pretest Posttest Follow-up
Group N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Experimental 15 8.06 1.48 8.26 1.59 8.73 1.59
Control 15 7.06 1.73 7.86 1.49 7.20 1.68
A comparison of pre, post and follow-up means indic-
ates that both groups declined in their mean scores from
posttest means to follow-up means.
To test H:3 a T-test for dependent means was used to
measure the degree of statistical significance between the
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posttest and follow-up test means of the experimental
group. The t value of -.901 is less than the critical
value of 2.145 at 14 degrees of freedom therefore the
difference between the posttest and follow-up test means
for the experimental group does not reach a level of
statistical significance. With no statistical difference
between the posttest and follow-up means of the experiment-
al group the null H:3 is rejected.
The results of T-test are presented in Table 7.
Table 7
Significance of the Difference Between the Mean
Posttest and Follow-up Test of the Experimental Group
» level of
Test N X SD Cr df t value significance
Posttest 15 9.26 1.59 2.55
14 -.901 NS
Follow-up 15 8.73 1.59 1.92
As Table 7 indicates effects of a short-term parent
training program did endure beyond the period of inter
vention and a three month follow-up test of moral reason
ing as measured by Piaget dilemma stories indicates that
posttest mean gains of the experimental group were not
lost as time elapsed.
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Expressed in percentiles, 66 2/3% of the children
whose parents participated in the parent training program
advanced in moral reasoning level as measured pre and
posttest by alternate forms of Piaget dilemma stories.
Forty-six percent of the children maintained their gains
as measured by a three month follow-up test. A third of
the children not only maintained their posttest gains but
continued to advance in their moral reasoning level scores
as measured by the follow-up test.
Hypothesis Four
H:4 There will be no significant difference between
the control and experimental groups' scores on the pre,
post and follow-up tests on the variables of the children's
age, sex or religious instruction.
Because the possibility that variables other than the
parent training program accounted for or significantly
influenced the follow-up gains of the experimental group
the variables of age, sex and religious instruction were
examined for their relationship to the test scores of the
two groups
.
Age
:
As was noted earlier the random sampling process
yielded experimental and control groups of the same age.
The experimental group has 7 subjects below the group mean
67
age of 8.10 and 6 subjects above. A comparison of their
mean, pre, post and follow-up scores by age shows no
difference
.
The control group had 5 subjects below the group
mean age of 8.10 and 8 subjects above. A comparison of
their mean scores by age pre, post and follow-up shows
that the younger children in the control group scored
lower pre, post and follow-up than the older children.
However, if age were a confounding variable the control
group with more children above the mean age of 8.10
would have attained a higher score pretest than the exper-
imental group and it did not. Nor was the pretest mean
score of the older control children as high as the pretest
mean for> the younger experimental children. Means by age,
pre, post and follow-up are presented in Table 8.
Table 8
Means by Age, Pre, Post and Follow-up
of Experimental and Control Groups
Group
Experimental
below X age
above X age
Control_
below X age
above X age
Pretest Posttest Follow-up
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean
15 8.06 1.48 9.26 1.59 8.73
7 8.28 9.28 8.85
6 8.33 9.33 8.83
15 7.06 1.73 7. 86 1.49 7.20
5 6.40 6.60 6.40
8 7.40 8.37 7.75
1.68
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As Table 8 indicates in this study where all subjects
were in the same academic grade, age was not a statistic-
ally significant variable. This cannot be generalized to
less homogenous samples. Age has been found to be a
significant correlate of maturity in moral judgment (Piaget
1965; Kohlberg, 1975) when comparisons are made between
different age groups.
Religious instruction:
In the present study 14 control group subjects and
12 experimental group subjects regularly attended weekly
classes in formal religious instruction. On the pretest
2 of the 4 children receiving no formal religious instruct-
ion scored below their group means and 2 scored above their
group mean. On the posttest only the subject in the control
group scored above the group mean. Three subjects scored
above their group mean on the follow-up test. Participat-
ion in formal religious instruction did not affect signi-
ficantly measured moral reasoning level within the study
population on the pre or posttest. However, on the follow-
up test there was statistical significance in both groups
between the means of the children who attended religious
classes and the children who did not. The means of the
subjects by attendance in religious classes are presented
in Table 9
.
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Table 9
Means of Subjects by Attendance of Religious
Instruction Classes Pre, Post and Follow-up
Group N
Pretest
Mean SD
Posttest
Mean SD
Follow-
Mean
up
SD
Experimental 15 8.06 1.48 9.26 1.59 8.73 1.59
Attendance 12 8.16 9.58 8.41
Non-
Attendance 3 7.66 8.00 10.00
Control 15 7.06 1.73 7.86 1.49 7.20 1.68
Attendance 14 7.14 7.78 7.07
Non-
Attendance 1 6.00 9.00 9.00
As Table 9 indicates the follow-up means for children
who did not attend regular religion classes were above
their respective group means. A T-test for independent
means was used to determine the level of significance for
mean differences within the experimental group. The t
value 3.00 at 13 degrees of freedom is above the critical
value 2.160 for .05 level of significance and approaches
critical value 3.012 for .01 level.
The t value 3 indicates that the difference between
follow-up mean of the experimental children who receive no
formal religious instruction and those who do is of
statistical significance. In both groups the children
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who did not attend formal religious instruction obtained
follow-up mean scores for measured moral reasoning above
their respective group follow-up means.
Sex:
The two groups were not evenly balanced by gender.
The experimental group had 9 girls and 6 boys. The control
group had 8 girls and 7 boys. In each group the pretest
mean for the boys was below the mean for the girls. How-
ever, the pretest mean for experimental boys considered
separately was equal to the mean for the control group
girls on the pretest thus indicating that by random
selection within a volunteer population of 8 and 9 year
old subjects girls and boys are not arbitrarily at diff-
erent levels of measured moral judgment because of gender.
What is of particular interest is that a sub-sample
of subjects (the experimental group boys) whose pretest
mean is equal to another sub-sample of subjects (the
control group girls) and who received the parent training
program treatment made greater gains on the posttest and
the follow-up test when compared to pretest mean than any
other sub-group.
Within the experimental group both boys and girls
show post and follow-up mean gains over pretest means.
The boys show greater gains. Within the control group
the pre, post and follow-up means do not reflect any
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significant changes due to the gender variable. The means
by gender, pre, post and follow-up are presented in Table
10 .
Table 10
Means by Gender of the Experimental and Control
Groups
,
Pre, Post and Follow- up Tests
Pretest Posttest Follow- up
Group N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Experimental 15 8.06 1.48 9.26 1.59 8.73 1.59
Girls 9 8.44 9.33 8.66
Boys 6 7.50 9.16 8.83
Control 15 7.06 1.73 7.86 1.49 7.20 1.68
Girls 8 7.50 8.37 7.62
Boys 7 6.57 7.28 6.71
As Table 10 shows the mean for boys in each group
was below the group mean pretest. The experimental group
boys' and the control group girls' means were the same.
A comparison of their post and follow-up means suggests
that the parent training program variable influenced the
differences
.
T-tests were used to determine the levels of signifi-
cance in differences between pre, post and follow-up means
by gender for the experimental group. T- tests for indep-
endent means were used to measure differences between
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boys and girls means. No statistical significance was
found between mean scores of boys and girls pre/post or
post/follow-up. T values were .191 pre/post and .314
post/follow-up
.
T-tests for dependent means were used to measure
significance of difference between pre, post and follow-up
means within each subgroup of the experimental group.
Gains between pre and post means were statistically sign-
ificant for each p<^. 05 for the boys; and p<(.01 for the
girls. Differences between post and follow-up means were
not statistically significant for either subgroup.
Results of the T-tests are given in Table 11.
Table 11
T Values for Differences in Pre, Post and Follow-Up
Means of the Experimental Group by Gender
t level of
Group N Test Means df values significance
Boys 6 pre/post 5 3.38 .05*
post/follow-up 5 0 NS
Girls 9 pre/post 8 3.63 .01**
post/follow-up 8 -.819 NS
* 5df p<.05 = 2.571 p<.01 - 4.032
** 8df p<(.05 -2.306 p<-01 = 3.355
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Table 11 shows that in the experimental group boys and
girls made statistically significant gains pre and posttest
and that there was no statistically significant difference
between their posttest and follow-up means.
Because boys and girls in the experimental group did
not differ in their gains on measured moral reasoning
while the variable of religious instruction was found to
have a statistically significant difference on follow-up
test results the null H;4 is partially rejected.
Follow-up tests scores were influenced by the greater
number of experimental children who did not attend rel-
igious instruction. These children had mean follow-up
gains which reached above .05 significance level when
compared with the mean of the other children.
Through statistical analysis of the mean scores the
four null hypotheses postulated have been rejected. These
findings will be discussed in Chapter V.
Individual Analysis
Mean scores do not adequately reflect the levels of
measured moral reasoning in the sample. Individual
patterns of change and trends must also be examined.
The Piaget dilemmas used in the testing interviews
assessed moral judgment on five dimensions: mtention-
ality
,
distributive justice, immanent justice, restitutive
justice versus expiatory punishment and adult authority
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versus equality of treatment. The raw scores by category
pre, post and follow-up tests are presented in Tables 12
and 13.
Table 12
Raw Scores by Category Pre, Post and Follow-up
Test of the Experimental Group
Category Pretest Posttest Follow-up
012012 012
I. Objective/subjective
responsibility
*Story #1 7 5 3 7 6 2 8 7 0
Story #2 5 10 0 3 12 0 8 7 0
12 15 3 10 18 2 16 14 0
II. Immanent Justice
Story #3 9 6 0 11 4 — 3 12 0
III. Restitutive justice/
Expiatory punishment
Story #4 0 14 1 1 11 3 0 14 1
Story #5 1 10 4 6 9 0 7 7 1
Story #9 7 8 0 5 10 0 6 7 2
8 32 5 12 30 3 i:3 28 4
IV. Distributive justice
Story #6 0 14 1 0 1 14 0 2 13
Story #10 6 8 1 2 9 4 2 12 1
6 22 2 2 10 18 2 14 14
V. Adult authority/
Equality of treatment
Story #7 6 6 3 3 10 2 1 10 4
Story #8 3 10 2 0 13 2 1 10 .4
9 16 5 3 23 4 2 20 8
* See Appendices
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Table 13
Raw Scores by Category Pre, Post and Follow-up
Test of the Control Group
Category Pretest Posttest Follow-up
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
I
.
Objective/subjective
responsibility
*S tory #1 14 1 0 15 0 0 15 0 0
Story #2 3 9 3 3 12 0 13 2 0
17 10 3 18 12 0 28 2 0
II
.
Immanent Justice
Story #3
8 7 0 5 10 0 3 12 0
III. Restitutive justice/
Expiatory punishment
Story #4 0 15 0 2 13 0 0 14 1
Story #5 0 13 2 11 3 1 6 9 0
Story #9 8 7 0 6 9 0 6 8 1
8 35 2 19 25 1 12 31 2
IV. Distributive justice
Story #6 1 13 1 0 1 14 0 7 8
Story #10 6 6 3 5 9 1 4 9 2
7 19 4 5 10 15 4 16 10
V. Adult authority/
Equality of treatment
Story #7 9 5 1 6 9 0 7 8 0
Story #8 4 11 0 2 12 1 1 14 0
13 16 1 8 21 1 8 22 0
*See Appendices
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As Tables 12 and 13 show, the range of raw scores pre-
test is 5 to 11 for the control group, 5 to 10 for the
experimental group. The posttest range is 6 to 10 for the
control group, 7 to 12 for the experimental group. The
raw score range on the follow-up test was 4 to 10 for the
control group, 7 to 12 for the experimental group.
Analysis of the raw scores shows that the experimental
group made more advances on each dimension than the control
group. A discussion of these findings will be presented
in the final chapter.
CHAPTER V
Summary and Recommendations
A discussion of both the quantitative and the qualit-
ative results of this study will be presented in this
chapter. Recommendations for practioners as well as
researchers will also be included.
The statistical analysis of the results of this study
has demonstrated that given a volunteer sample of parents
who are concerned about the moral education and development
of their latency age children, a short-term parent training
program in the use of induction and the concepts of
cognitive development theory can be effective in advancing
the levels of moral reasoning in their children as measured
by instruments designed from Piaget dilemma stories.
Hypothesis I
H:1 There will be no significant statistical difference
between the mean pretest and the mean posttest scores in
measured moral judgment of children whose parents are
trained to make direct intervention in their moral develop-
ment using induction and the concepts of cognitive-
developmental theory was rejected. Differences between
the pre and posttest means of the experimental group
reached .05 level of statistical significance.
While the sample size used in this study is small
and no replication has been made, the results
obtained
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support the contention that latency age children whose
parents apply these principles will advance in measured
moral reasoning more rapidly than would occur through
normal maturation.
The results support the findings of both Piaget and
Kohlberg. Piaget (1965) said that advanced moral reason-
ing in children was linked to the verbal communications
of the parents. Kohlberg and his associates have demon-
strated that moral dilemma discussions will advance moral
reasoning levels if they are conducted in an atmosphere
of affiliation, justice and respect (Kohlberg, 1978)
.
Hypothesis II
H:2 There will be no significant difference in gains
between the mean pre and posttest scores in measured
moral judgment of children whose parents participate in
the training program and the children whose parents do
not participate. This hypothesis was rejected because
the mean gain of the control group did not reach the
level of statistical significance.
Through statistical analysis the null H:1 and the
null H : 2 were rejected however, the statistical evidence
does not demonstrate a cause and effect relationship. The
posttest means probably reflected some practice effect.
Because practice effects may explain some of the differences
between pre and posttest means a three month follow-up was
administered to both groups to determine if changes had
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endured over time. The results of the follow-up test
revealed that the gains made by the experimental children
were maintained.
It is an assumption of cognitive-developmental theory
that changes in cognitive structures in conjuntion with
changes in the child's social interactions advance the
level of moral reasoning. These changes are permanent
reorganizations and stable. Transitory gains between pre
and posttest could not be considered organizational trans-
formations which are the prerequisites of advances in
moral reasoning levels (Damon, 1977) .
Hypothesis III
H:3 The effects of a short-term parent training program
will not endure beyond the period of intervention and a
three month follow-up test will not indicate significant
changes over time. The null H:3 was rejected because T-
tests showed that there was no statistically significant
difference between the experimental groups post and follow
up means. Their posttest gains were maintained.
The slight gains pre and post for the control group
disappeared over the three month interval which supports
the findings of Damon (1977) that in normal maturation
the levels of moral reasoning in latency are slow to
advance. His studies found that a change in moral reason-
ing level is not evident in less than one year.
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While pre/posttest results may not be sufficient
indicators of cognitive structure change because they are
vulnerable to practice effect and conditioned responses,
the follow-up test mean of the experimental group indicates
cognitive structure changes and true advances in levels of
measured moral reasoning.
Results of this study suggest that with a parent
intervention applying the concepts of cognitive development-
al theory and the use of induction the rate of advance in
levels of measured moral reasoning of average 8 and 9 year
old children can be accelerated. Accelerating the advance
of moral reasoning in children would have no useful purpose
in itself if other research findings had not found a high
correlation between level of moral reasoning and level of
moral behavior (Kohlberg, 1958, 1963; Krebs & Kohlberg,
1973; Blotner, 1981).
Hypothesis IV
Hypothesis IV examined the influence of variables other
than the parent training program on the results of the
measured moral reasoning of the subjects.
H :
4
There will be no significant differences between
the experimental and control groups' scores, pre, post
and follow-up due to the children^' age, sex or religious
instruction. Through statistical analysis of mean scores
the null H : 4 is partially rejected.
Whiteman and Hosier (1964) found that moral judgment
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in children of normal intelligence ages 7 to 12 years was
not significantly influenced by the sex of the subject or
by regular attendance at Sunday School.
However, results of this study indicated that
children who did not attent regular classes in religious
instruction had statistically significant higher means on
the follow-up test than the children who did attend such
classes. This finding must be interpreted with great
caution because only 4 subjects did not attend religion
classes. While it raises questions the number is too
small to make generalizations.
On the variable of age no differences were found.
On the gender variable the pretest mean scores of the boys
were lower than the girls in each group. However, both
boys and girls in the experimental group made and maintain
ed gains which were statistically significant but were
not of statistically significant difference from each
other
.
In each group the boys' lower pretest scores may have
been a function of expressive language difference rather
than a difference in moral knowledge due to the gender
variable. The effects of the treatment on the experimental
boys may have been, in part, an advance in verbal
express-
ion due to changes in the parent/child interactions
as well
as advances in moral reasoning.
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Limitations
The small sample size limits the degree to which
these results may be generalized. The nature of the parent
training program requires that the participants be
volunteers. This prevents a random selection of subjects
representative of the general population. It is not anti-
cipated that a randomly selected sample would obtain these
results. Given a volunteer sample of parents who are
concerned about the moral development of their latency age
children, it is probable that the children of the parents
who participate in the parent-training program will
advance in measured moral reasoning level more rapidly
than would occur in normal maturation.
A less homogenous sample than the one in this study
may have different statistical results. The homogeneity
of the sample served to eliminate ambiguity about the
effectiveness of the parent training program because it
controlled for the variables of race, socioeconomic status
and age.
In this study the posttest was administered during
the fourth week of June. The three month interval be-
tween the post and follow-up tests included the two
months
of school summer vacation. During this period the
children from the two groups had maximum opportunities
to interact in free play with minimum adult
supervision
and formal teaching. Results of this study
suggest that
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for 8 and 9 year olds peer learning is subordinate to
adult influence in acquiring moral knowledge. The mean
of the control group children on the follow-up does not
reflect advances from increased peer interactions. For
each group the follow-up mean shews some decline. Results
of the follow-up tests may be quite different if the entire
program is given during the regular school year when time
is more structured and adult influences more dominant.
A number of contributing variables could not be
analyzed statistically. The treatment itself was subject
to differences in the parents' understanding and diligence
in application. While it was the goal of the training
program to set in motion an ongoing process of Socratic
method, it is not known hew many parents carried on beyond
the period of intervention, thus follow-up scores for the
experimental group children cannot be said to be solely
the results of a four week treatment or intervention. What
can be said with more certainty is that in a short-term
training program parents can learn to use induction and
concepts of cognitive-developmental theory to advance the
level of measured moral reasoning in their latency age
children and that latency age children can advance in
their level of measured moral reasoning as a function of
their parents' direct intervention to stimulate cognition,
empathy and role-taking.
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While Piaget says that childrens' moral judgments are
characterized by increasingly more mature levels of moral
reasoning throughout latency, the changes in the raw scores
indicate that for this sample at least, there was consider-
able inconsistency on some dimensions and also some
regression. Some of this may be due to how closely a given
story paralleled prior experiences of individual subjects.
In some instances the children may have had to make purely
hypothetical judgments while in others, experience may have
supported and informed their reasoning. Fatigue or other
pressures may have been operating on subjects who showed
dramatic regression between pretest and follow-up scores
although all of the subjects appeared to be actively
interested in the story situations and free from distract-
ions. This phenomenon could also reflect the commonly
occuring effect termed by statisticians as "regression
toward the mean".
Variability of the test stories from one instrument
to another may explain some regression. There is a dearth
of reliable and valid test instruments for assessing the
level of moral reasoning in latency age children. A
different test instrument might yield different statistical
data but the variability of each subject's responses sup-
ports the use of the clinical interview method.
Stories dealing with equality of treatment were
almost without exception answered at level one on the
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pretest. V7here distributive justice involved material
goods or food strict equality was unanimous, particularly
among siblings. Yet children who could not concede any
inequality in treatment or privilege among siblings as
fair could be magnanimous toward the needs of peer and
younger, smaller children. Stories about punishment were
answered with relative consistency. Children who believed
in restitutive punishment on the pretest tended to apply
the same principle on subsequent tests. Children who
believed in expiatory punishment were consistent.
The greatest inconsistency was in the consideration of
intention when making moral judgments. The researcher had
misgivings about including the stories from Piaget about
intentionality in stealing and lying for this age group
because so much research documents that by age 7 children
judge by intention rather than consequences. On the pre-
test story about the boy who stole a roll for a hungry
friend versus the girl who stole a ribbon for herself, 7
experimental children and 14 control children made no
consideration of intention in judging the guilt of the
story characters. In stories of justice and punishment
concerning material damage some children who did not
consider intentionality in stealing or lying made their
judgments on distinctions between intentional or accidental
damage. The judicial refinements some of these children
made were worthy of Solomon.
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Changes in cognitive structure do not lend themselves
to statistical analysis precisely because they are not
changes in amount or quantity but changes in form., organ-
izational transformations which are qualitative rather
than quantitative (Damon, 1977, p. 334)
.
Piaget says that in his studies he found no child
who was operating wholly on a given level of moral reason-
ing but that with increasing age there were increasingly
more subjective responses than objective ones. Kohlberg
found that individuals' moral reasoning is fifty percent
in their dominant stage with the remainder mixed between
the next adjacent stages. Analysis of raw scores in this
study support the findings of Piaget and Kohlberg.
Every protocol pre, post and follow-up and pilot study
had at least one zero or immature response. There was not
a single subject, at any time, wholly functioning on a
given level of moral reasoning. Within the period of the
study no child advanced more than one level at a time on any
dimension
.
The experimental group made significantly more
advances from level one responses to level two responses
than the control group.
An analysis of the raw scores of the pretest and
follow-up interviews for each group shows that the
experimental group made 20 responses which indicates
an
advance from level one to level two in moral reasoning
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compared to 10 such responses for the control group. The
experimental group showed advances on each dimension. The
control group showed persistent immaturity on the dimension
of intentionality . The experimental group showed more
advances on the distributive justice dimension with 12
subjects moving from level one to level two. The most
advances were made by the experimental group on the
dimension of equality of treatment versus adult authority.
The nature of the treatment technique, the parent asking
the child's opinions, predisposed the changes on this
dimens ion
.
Qualitative Evaluation
While results of this study demonstrate that a
Kohlberg-type intervention can be used effectively with
latency age children in the natural setting of the home it
should be pointed out that the use of dilemma stories
drawn from the social world of children rather than from the
realm of adult moral conflicts may have had a significant
bearing on the outcome for two reasons. First, the child-
ren could relate to the story dilemmas which dealt with
issues they grapple with daily, lying, cheating, tale-
bearing, jealous rivalries with classmates and siblings.
Second, in this parent sample there was consensus about
what is moral behavior on these issues for their children.
The training meetings took on a support group atmosphere
88
as they discovered their shared beliefs and values.
The psychological benefits which this group of
experimental mothers claimed deserve to be mentioned even
though they cannot be validated by statistical evidence
or generalized beyond this sample. To begin with each
parent, control and experimental, initally expressed
interest in the program because of apprehension that moral
chaos is lurking in wait for the child at adolescence. Most
said they felt alone in the struggle to teach moral values
of the child. The training program revived these parents'
sense of efficacy as moral educators of their children at
the same time enhancing the parent-child relationship.
A number of mothers expressed delighted surprise at
the discovery of the child as a moral thinker. Most of
the mothers said they had not realizes that what they had
thought of as good communications with the child was their
telling the child rather than asking and listening. As the
program progressed they could feel their respect for the
child growing. They came to look forward to the "treatment"
sessions and most of them kept copious log notes.
It was exciting for the researcher to see these dev-
elopments. The parent-training program was deliberately
designed to take advantage of this felicitous period in the
parent-child relationship but in the present study the
psychological benefits to the parents far exceeded the
researcher's expections
.
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The statistical evidence that of all subgroups the
boys in the experimental group made the most advances in
measured moral reasoning level may be partially explained
as a more dramatic change in the mother-son interactions
than in the mother- daughter interactions. While all of
the girls were reported to enjoy the treatment sessions,
several of the boys were reluctant to participate until the
second or third week. These boys' mothers were advised to
try each day to engage the child but not to insist. By
the end of the third week boys as well as girls were re-
minding their mothers.
From the researcher's observations all the children
enjoyed the interview sessions and seriously deliberated
on each dilemma. No rewards were used during the program
except the unmeasurable compliment of being listened to
attentively
.
Just as Kohlberg and his associates found that older
students advanced through stages of moral reasoning one
stage at a time so the results of this study indicate that
younger children will advance one level at a time. Under-
standing the levels of moral reasoning in younger children
will aid parents to introduce higher levels of reasoning
to their children which are within their grasp. Failure
to understand that their children cannot comprehend reason-
ing more than one level above their present dominant level
causes misunderstandings between parent and child which
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can be avoided. Many children don't learn not because the
parent isn't teaching but because the parent is reasoning
on a level the child cannot understand.
Teaching parents to use induction has impli cations
for child guidance and child management . As the parent
discovers the child's level of social/iroral responsibility
through dilemma discussions the parent can set realistic
behavior expectations and more effectively guild the cnilo
to higher levels of reasoning on the moral issues which are
encountered by the child.
Another implication for child guidance is the long
term: effect of the Socratic Method for developing the
child's confidence in his own thinking. Although it does
not guarantee that the child will become a leader, the
child who grows in confidence that he/she can reason and
arrive at solutions in social/moral situations is not likely
to become a dependent follower of the crowd. The
research
findings of Coopersmith (1967) support this. A
persistent
fear expressed by mothers in the current study
was that
their children would become followers. They
worried about
how they could guard their children against
the peer
pressures in adolescence which can ruin their
lives.
The latency period is the logical time to
begin direct
moral education using induction and moral
discussion. The
parent-child relationship is still the dominant
influence.
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Teaching the parent how to take an active effective role
as moral educator of the child will promote the child's
moral growth while strengthening the parent-child bond.
Early use of the Socratic Method is seen as preventing
adolescent rebellion and fixation at Kohlberg's first and
second stages. As Holstein (1969) found in studies of
8th graders and their families, children with advanced
moral development came from homes where parents encouraged
moral discussion.
The parents contacted for the current study frequently
expressed reservations about the content of moral educat-
ion programs. They were reassured at the outset that the
program would be a methods course for themselves, they
would teach their children, thus retaining control of the
content. This aspect of the prorgram has very significant
implications for all moral education programs. Parents do
not gladly relinquish the moral education of their children.
Throughout the training sessions parents were continually
reminded that latency age children need rules, discipline
and guidance. The parent-training program was presented
as a supplement to their existing child rearing methods
in preparation for the challenges ahead when there may not
always be a fixed rule from the past to guide them.
Teaching children to apply the principles of justice and
empathy within a relationship of respect and caring pre-
pares them for any eventuality with confidence.
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Recommendations for Practitioners
As the program evolved the need for several minor
changes became evident. It is suggested that drawing on
the background information provided for the first training
meeting, the trainer modify the material to suit the
interest level of the group. In the present study less
time could have been spent on cognitive developmental
theory and more on the use of induction and the levels
of moral reasoning.
When the parent training sessions met for the
experimental group the levels of reasoning were explained
through lecture and handouts. Although practiced in work-
shop a number of the mothers did not clearly understand
the differences between the levels. In the later sessions
with the control group mothers the researcher played
excerpts from the interview tapes to illustrate differences
in levels of reasoning. Listening to children's responses
made the distinction much clearer to the mothers. It is
suggested that sample answers from the scoring criteria be
used during training or a tape of children responding at
different levels
.
The parents in one group of experimental mothers made
more progress than the others making up dilemmas from the
children's real life situations. The trainer should
budget extra time to develop this if necessary because
it is so important to the ongoing use of the techniques
and skills which the program is designed to develop.
The methods and procedures in the parent training
program, can easily be adapted for use by elementary
teachers to stimulate moral discussions is the classroom.
Group inclusion and acceptance are developmental tasks
of the latency period. Through classroom, discussions of
the social/moral dilemmas in peer interactions the teacher
can foster mutal understanding and respect among the
children as peer expectations are explored and developed
in a just community.
Counselors and clinicians who are working on child
management issues can augment Adlerian and behavior
modification models with parent training in the concepts
of cognitive-developmental theory and the use of induction.
The research of Hoffman (1970a) shows the child's inner
controls are correlated to the parent's use of induction
while the present study demonstrates that parents can learn
to apply these principles in a relatively short time. Use
of the Socratic Method fosters those aspects of inter-
personal relationships which are the foundation of morality.
Although parents can learn these principles in individual
or family sessions, the group process is particularly suited
to this type of intervention.
A further recommendation to assist practitioners and
parents is the development of dilemma stories for use with
American children of latency age. The Brady stories are
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not readily available and although the goal of the training
program is to teach parents to generate dilemma stories
from real life experiences of the child, in the initial
phases of the program impersonal stories are needed.
Recommendations for Researchers
In the final section further research suggested by the
results of this study will be discussed. Taken in isolat-
ion the statistical data supports the effectiveness of the
parent training program, however, the sample size was small
and homogenous therefore the results can only be generalized
with caution beyond the sample investigated.
It would be worthwhile to undertake a study which
examined the effects of the parent training program with
parents from other socioeconomic backgrounds . As noted
earlier a less homogenous sample may yield different
statistical results. Different samples on the variables
of race, age, religious instruction might also be studied
to determine if the training program has general usefulness.
The differences between the mean gains of the girls
and the boys in the experimental group as well as the
lower pretest scores for boys in this sample suggest a
research study. Are 8 and 9 year old boys, in general,
more responsive to the treatment than girls and if so,
why.
Are the differences language-based?
The psychological benefits of increased sense of
efficacy as moral educator and increased appreciation
of
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the child which the mothers in this study expressed at the
end of the program deserve to be examined in depth. Another
research study might investigate whether these observations
were unique to this group or if they represent a more
generalized effect of the program itself upon any volunteer
sample of parents concerned about the moral development of
their latency age children.
Although this type of study does not lend itself as
easily to statistical research that should not rule out
such inquiry or discourage other researchers.
A longitudinal study is recommended to determine if
parents once trained in the concepts of cognitive-develop-
mental theory and the use of induction continue to apply
these principles. The raw scores of the follow-up test
indicated that some children maintained earlier gains while
other children continued to gain. Because the goal of the
training program is to begin an ongoing process of Socratic
Method enduring changes in the parent practices might be
investigated.
Finally, it is recommended that the test instrument
be subjected to more rigorous validation studies. xhe
variability in the subjects' responses suggests that
variability in the Piaget dilemma stories may have partially
influenced the results. Not all the stories suggested
empathic possibilities for level 2 responses. It is
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important to note however that where empathic possibilities
were suggested in the stories not all the children grasped
them.
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APPENDIX A-l
Letter of Introduction
April 14, 1982
Dear Third Grade Parents,
I am happy to intoduce to you Mrs. Catherine
Leveroni, a doctoral candidate in School Psychology at
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Mrs. Leveroni
is a former school psychologist in the Dedham Public
Schools and has had a great deal of experience working
with children and their parents.
She is engaged in research for her doctorate degree
and would like your cooperation. Her plans are described
in the accompanying letter. Dr. Harry McKay and I have
offered our enthusiastic support.
Regina Tierney, Principal
Avery School
106
107
APPENDIX A-
2
Letter of Invitation and Permission
April 14
,
1982
Dear Mother,
I am writing to invite you and your 3rd grader to
take part in a 4 week program on Moral Education and
Reasoning at the Avery School.
The program will begin the second week in May. There
will be a one hour meeting each week for 4 weeks for
mothers. Each meeting will combine a discussion about
moral development in children and a workshop to teach and
practice skills for helping children's moral growth.
Home and parents, especially mothers, ^re the most
important influence on the moral development of their
children. I hope you will join us.
An orientation meeting will be held on Friday, May
7th at 10:00 A.M. in the Avery School Library. The follow-
ing meetings will be scheduled to meet at the mothers'
convenience
.
If you are interested in participating or in finding
out more, please fill in and return the form at the bottom
of the page. If you are interested but cannot attend the
orientation meeting please. call me at 333-0136 or call the
Avery School 326-5354. Acceptance must be received by
this Friday, April 16th.
Thank you.
Sincerely
,
Catherine Leveroni
Name
:
Child's Name:
Child's Teacher:
Home Phone:
Child' s Age:
My child and I would like to take part in the Moral
Education and Reasoning Program.
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September 28, 1982
Dear Parents:
To complete the research project in moral development
which we began last spring, I will be giving your child
a follow-up interview during the week of October 4.
All parents who are interested are invited to come
to four parent training meetings which will be held:
Dates: Tuesday evenings Oct. 12, 19, 26 & Nov. 2
Time : 7:30 p.m.
Location: Endicott Library
Thank you and your child for your help and cooperation.
It has been a pleasure working with everyone who participated.
I look forward to meeting more parents this fall.
Sincerely
,
Catherine Leveroni
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Pre-Test
Directions
:
1. Read both stories in each set to the child individually.
2. Ask the child to repeat the stories to be sure he/she
understands them and remembers the important details.
3. Ask the child the questions following the stories.
Ask probe questions if necessary.
4. Record his/her answers exactly as they are given and
tape record also.
5. Interviewer should substitute if child does not know
the meaning of a word.
1A. Joey met a friend of his who is very poor. This friend
told Joey that he had had no dinner that day because
there was nothing to eat in his home. Then Joey went
into a baker's shop, and. since he had no money, he
waited till the baker's back was turned and stole a roll.
Then he ran out and gave the roll to his friend.
B. Patricia went into a shop. She saw a pretty piece of
ribbon on a table and thought to herself that it would
look very nice in her hair. So while the shop lady's
back was turned (while the shop lady was not looking) ,
she stole the ribbon and ran away at once.
A. Are these children equally guilty?
B. Which one is naughtiest? Is one worse than the other?
C. Why?
2A. A boy (or a girl) went for a walk in the street and met
a big dog who frightened him very much. So then he went
home and told his mother he had seen a dog that was as
big as a cow.
the teacher had given
or bad. Then his mot:
him.
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A. Why did they say those things?
B. Which story is naughtier? Is one worse than the other"*
C . Why?
Probe questions about the lie:
What is a lie? Is it worse to lie to a grown-up
or someone your own age? Why?
3. Once there were two children who were stealing apples
in an orchard. Suddenly a policeman came along and
the two children ran away. One of them was
caught. The other one, going home by a roundabout
way, crossed a river on a rotten bridge and fell into
the water. Now what do you think?
A. If he had not stolen the apples and had crossed the
river on that rotten bridge all the same, would he
also have fallen into the water?
B. Why?
4. A lot of boys, as they were coming out of school, went
to play in the street, and started throwing snowballs
at each other. One of the boys threw his ball too
far and broke a window-pane. A man came out of the
house and asked wjio did it. As no one answered he went
and complained to the school principal. Next day the
teacher asked the class who broke the window. But,
again, no one spoke. The boy who had done it said it
wasn't he, and the others won't tell on him.
A. What should the teacher do? (If the child does not
answer or misses the point, you can add details to
make things clearer.)
B. Should she punish no one, or the whole class?
C. Why?
D. What should be done? Should the others tell?
5. A boy had broken a toy belonging to his little brother.
What should be done? Should he D give the little brother
one of his own toys? 2) pay for having it mended? 3)
not be allowed to play with any of his own toys for a
whole week?
A. Are all the punishments fair?
B. Which is the fairest?
C. Why?
D. Which is the most unfair?
E. Why?
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6. Two boys
,
a little one and a big one, once went for a
long walk in the mountains
. When lunch-time came they
were very hungry and took their food out of their bags.
But they found that there was not enough for both of
them.
A. What should have been done?
B. Give all the food to the big boy or to the little one,
or the same to both?
C. Why?
7. A mother was on the lake in a little boat with her
children. At four o’clock she gave them each a roll.
One of the boys started playing around at the end of
the boat. He leaned right over the boat and lets his
roll fall in. What should be done to him? Should he
have nothing to eat, or should they each have given
him a little piece of theirs?
A. Which is fair?
B. Why?
8. A father had two boys. One of them always grumbled
when he was sent to deliver messages. The other one
didn't like being sent either, but he always went
without saying a word. So the father used to send the
boy who didn’t grumble on messages more often than the
other one. What, do you think of that?
A. Was it fair?
B. Why?
9. Once there was a boy who was playing in the kitchen
while his mother was out. He broke a cup. When his
mother came home, he said, "It wasn't me, it was the
cat. It jumped up there." The mother saw quite well
that this was a lie. She was very angry and punished
the boy. How did she punish him? (You leave it to
the child to decide upon the punishment.)
Now this is a story almost the same as the last one
but it has a different ending. Listen carefully for
the difference.
B. Once there was a boy who was playing in the kitchen
when his mother was out. He broke a cup. When his
mother came home, he said, "It wasn't me, it was the
cat. It jumped up there." The mother saw quite well
that this was a lie. The mother didn't punish him.
112
She just explained that it wasn't very nice to tell
lies. "You wouldn't like it if I were to tell you
lies. Suppose you were to ask me for some of the
cake that's in the cupboard, and I said there was
none left when really there was some, you wouldn't
think that nice, would you? Well, it is just the
same when you tell me lies. It makes me sad."
A few days later, the two boys were both playing in
the kitchen. And this time they are playing with
the matches. When their mother came in, one of them
told a lie again, and said he was not playing with
the matches. The other one owned up at once.
A. Which one was it who told the lie again, the one who
had been punished for telling the lie, or the one
who had only been talked to?
B. Why?
10. What do you think is unfair?
A. What kind of thing do you think is most unfair?
B . Why?
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Name
Age :
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
5 .
6 .
7 .
8 .
9 .
10 .
APPENDIX B-l
Pre-test Score Sheet
Answer: A. (Yes or no)
C. Reason:
Answer: A.
C. Reason:
Answer: A.
B. Reason:
Answer: A.
B.
C. Reason for B:
D. What should be done?
Answer: A. (Yes or no) B.
C. Reason for B: D.
E. Reason for D:
Answer: A.
B. Reason:
Answer: A.
B. Reason:
Answer: A.
B. Reason:
Answer: A.
C. Reason
Answer: A.
B. Reason:
Sex: M F
Total Score
B.
Score
B.
Score
Score
Score
(please circle 123
(please circle 123
Score
Score
Score
Score
B
.
Score
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Posttest
Directions
:
1. Read both stories in each set to the child.
2. Ask the child to repeat the stories to be sure
he/she understands them and remembers the
important details.
3. Ask the child the questions following the
stories
.
4. Record his/her answers exactly as they are given.
1A. Ruth had a friend who kept a bird in a cage. Ruth
thought the bird was very unhappy, and she was al-
ways asking her friend to let him out. But the
friend wouldn't. So one day when her friend wasn't
there, Ruth went and stole the bird. She let it fly
away and hid the cage in the attic so that the bird
should never be shut up in it again.
B. Julie stole some candy from her mother one day when
her mother was not there, and she hid it and ate it
all up.
A. Are these children equally naughty?
B. Which one is more guilty?
C. - Why?
2A. A child who didn't know the names of streets very
well was not quite sure where Am.es Street was (a
street near the school where we were working) . One
day a gentleman stopped him in the street and asked
him where Ames Street was. So the boy answered, "I
think it is there. ' But it was not there. xhe
gentleman completely lost his way and could not find
the house he was looking for.
B. A boy knows the names of the streets quite well. One
day a gentleman asked him where Ames Street was. But
the boy wanted to play him a trick and said, it was
there, and showed him the wrong street. But the
gentleman didn't get lost, and managed to find his
way again.
A. Are they equally guilty?
B. Which boy is naughtier?
C. Why?
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3. In a class of very little children the teacher had
forbidden them to sharpen their pencils themselves.
Once, when the teacher had her back turned, a little
boy took the knife-they didn't have a pencial sharp-
ener like ours-and was going to sharpen his pencil.
But he cut his finger.
A. If the teacher had allowed him to sharpen his pencil,
would he have cut himself just the same?
B. Why? •
4. During a school outing, the teacher allowed the
children to play in a barn, on the condition that
they put everything back as they found it before
going away. One of them took a rake, another a spade,
and they all went off in a different direction. One
of the boys took a wheelbarrow and went and played
by himself, until he broke it. Then he came back
when no one was looking and hid the barrow in the
barn. In the evening when the teacher looked to see
if everything was tidy he found the broken barrow
and asked who had done it. But the boy who had done
it said nothing, and the other didn't know who it was.
A. What should the teacher do?
B. Should the whole class be punished or no one?
C. Why?
D. * What should be done?
5.
One afternoon a boy was playing in his room. His
father had only asked him not to play ball for fear
of breaking the windows. His father had hardly gone
when the boy got his ball out of the cupboard and
began to play with it. And bang went the ball against
the window pane and smashed it. When the father came
home and saw what had happened he thought of three
punishments : 1) To leave the window unmended for
several days (and then, since it was winter, the boy
would not be able to play in his room) . 2) Make the
boy pay for having broken the window. 3) Not to let
him have his toys for a whole week.
A. Are all the punishments fair?
B. Which one is fairest?
C . Why ?
D. Which one is most unfair?
6.
Two boys were running races (or playing marbles,
etc.)
One was big, the other little.
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A. Should they both have started from the same place, or
should the little one have started nearer?
B . Why ?
7. A mother had two girls, one obedient, the other dis-
obedient. The mother liked the obedient one best
and gave her the biggest piece of cake. What do you
think of that?
A. Was it fair?
B . Why ?
8. Once there was a camp of Boy Scouts (or Girl Scouts).
Each one had to do his bit to help with the work and
leaves things tidy. One had to do the shopping,
another washed up, another brought in wood and swept
the floor. One day there was no bread and the one
who did the shopping had already gone. So the
Scoutmaster asked one of the Scouts who had already
done his job to go and fetch the bread.
A. What did the boy do?
B. Was that fair to ask him to go get the bread?
C . Why ?
9A. A boy was playing in his room, while his father was
.working in town. After a little while the boy
thought he would like to draw. But he had no paper.
Then he remembered that there were some white sheets
of paper in one of the drawers on his father's desk.
So he went quite guietly to look for them. He found
them and took them away. When the father came home
he found that his desk was untidy and finally dis-
covered that someone had stolen his paper. He went
straight into the boy's room, and there he saw the
floor covered with sheets of paper that were all
scribbled over with colored chalk. Then the father
was very angry and gave his boy a good whipping.
B. Now I shall tell you a story that is nearly the same,
but not quite (the story is repeated shortly , except
for the last sentence) . It ends up differently.
The father did not punish him. He just explained to
him that it wasn't right of him. He said, "When
you're not at home, when you've qone to school, if I
were to go and take your toys, you wouldn't like it.
So when I'm not there, you mustn't go and take my
paper either. It is not nice for me. It isn t right
to do that.
"
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Now a few days later these two boys were each play-
ing in his own garden. The boy who had been punish-
ed was in his garden, and the one who had not been
punished was playing in his garden. And then each
of them found a pencil. They were their fathers'
pencils. Then each of them remembered that his father
had said that he had lost his pencil in the street
and that it was a pity because he wouldn't be able
to find it again. So then they thought that if they
were to steal the pencils, no one would ever know,
and there would be no punishment.
Well now, one of the boys kept the pencil for himself,
and the other took it back to his father.
A. Guess which one took it back—the one who had been
well punished for having taken the paper or the one
who was only talked to?
B . Why ?
10. What do you think is unfair?
What do you think is the most unfair?
Why?
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POSTTEST SCORE SHEET
Name
:
Sex M F
Age : Score
1. Answer: A.
C. Reason:
B.
2. Answer: A.
C. Reason:
B.
3. Answer: A.
B. Reason:
4. Answer: A.
B.
C. Reason for B.
D. What should be dene?
5. Answer: A.
C. Reason for B:
B. (Please circle one) 123
D. (Please circle one ) 1
E. Reason for D:
2 3
6. Answer: A
B. Reason:
7. Answer: A.
B. Reason:
8. Answer: A.
B.
C. Reason:
9. Answer: A.
B.
C. Reason:
10. Answer: A.
3. Reason:
Total Score
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FOLLOW-UP TEST
Directions
1. Read both stories in each set to the child.
2. Ask the child to repeat the stories.
3. Ask the child the questions following the stories.
4. Record his/her answers exactly as they are given.
1A. Once a boy named Danny wanted to surprise his mother for
her birthday but he didn't have any money to buy her a
present. His next door neighbor had some pretty flowers
in his garden. When the neighbor was not at home Danny
stole the flowers and gave them to his mother for a
birthday present.
B. Matthew was visiting his friend. In his friend's garden
there were some strawberries growing. When his friend
wasn't looking Matthew stole some strawberries. He hid
them in his pocket and ate them all on his way home.
A. Are these children equally guilty?
B. Which one is naughtiest?
C. Why?
2A. A boy was playing in his room. His mother called and asked
him to run a message for her. But he didn't feel like going
out so he told his mother his feet were hurting. But it
wasn't true; his feet were not hurting him in the least.
• B. A boy wanted very much to go for a .ride in a truck, but
no one ever asked him. One day he saw a beautiful true
in the street and would have loved to be inside it. So
when he got home he told them that the man in the truck had
stopped and had taken him for a little drive. But it was
not true; he had made it all up.
A.
B.
C.
3.
Are they equally guilty?
Which bey is naughtiest?
Why ?
There was a boy who disobeyed his mother. He took her
scissors one day when he had been tol-d not to.
them back in their place before his
she never noticed anything. The nex 1
walk and crossed a stream on a lltbl® btidge.
But th
plank was rotten. It gave way, and in he falls
with a
splash
.
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A. Why did he fall into the water?
B. And if he had not disobeyed would he have fallin in just
the same?
C. Why?
t. Some boys were throwing snowballs against a wall. They were
allowed to do this, but on condition they did not throw
them too high, because high up there was a window, and
the window-panes might get broken. The boys had a great
time, all except one who was clumsy and who was not very
good at throwing snowballs. Then, when no one was look-
ing he picked up a pebble and put snow all around it to
make a good hard ball. 'Then he threw it, and it went so
high that it struck the window, broke the window-pane,
and fell into the room. When the father came home he saw
what had happened. He even found the pebble with some
melted snow on the floor. Then he was angry and asked who
had done this. But the boy who had done it said it wasn't
he, and so did the others.
A.. What should the father have done?
3. Punished everyone or no one?
C . Why ?
D. What should be done?
5. A boy had not done his homework for school. The next day
he told the teacher he couldn't do his math because he
was sick. But he had fine rosy cheeks so the teacher
thought that he was making it up, and she told his father
and mother. The father wanted to punish the boy, but he
couldn't decide between three punishments. 1) to copy a
poem fifty time, 2) the father could say to the boy, "You
say you are sick. Very well then, we shall take care of
you. You will go to bed for a whole day and take a dose of
medicine to make you better." 3) Or the father could say,
"You have told a lie. Now I shall not be able to believe
you any longer, and even if you tell the truth I shall not
be sure." The next day the boy got a good mark at school.
Whenever he got a good mark his father gave him a dime
to put in his bank. But this time the father said, "That
may be true, old man, but you told a lie yesterday so I
can't believe you any longer. I won't give you a dime
today because I don't know whether what you are telling me
is the truth. If you go several days without telling any
lies then I shall believe you again and everything will
be all right."
A. Which is the fairest of these three punishments.
B . Why
?
C. Which is the most unfair?
D . Why ?
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6. Two girls were swimming in a race. One was big and the
other one was little. Should they both start at the same
time or should the little one get a headstart?
Why
:
7. Once there was a family with a lot of boys. They all had
holes in their shoes, one day their father told them to
take their shoes to the shoemaker to be mended. But
one of the brothers had been disobedient several days
before so the father said to him, "You won't go to the
shoemaker. You can keep your holes you have been dis-
obedient. "
A. Was this fair?
3. Why?
8. One Thursday afternoon, a mother asked her girl and
boy to help her about the house, because she was tired.
The girl was to dry the dishes and the boy was to bring
in some wood. But the boy (or girl) went and played in
the street. So the mother asked the other one to do
all the work. What did he say?
A. Was this fair?
3 . Why ?
9.
Once there was a boy playing in the garage while his father
was not at home. He found some wood and thought be would
like to make something with his father's tools. He cut the
wood with his father's saw. It was hard work and it took
him a long time. He was tired after cutting the wood so
he left everything and went into the house to watch TV.
When his father came home and put his car in the garage
he saw what the boy had done. The father went into the
house. He was very angry and he punished the boy.
A. How did he punish him?
Now I shall tell you a story that is nearly the same but
not
quite (repeat the story except for the last sentence).
This father did not punish the boy. He j us t, explained
°
him that it wasn't right to use other people s things witho
asking. He said, "You wouldn't like it if I went
room while you were at school, used your things and
^tt
^
them scattered around your room. It isn t right to
d *
A few days later these two boys were playing in
the yar^.
While they were playing they accidentally bro -
One boy said, "Let's say we don t know who did
it, we
found it that way."
Which boy said this, the one who was punished or the one
who was talked to?
Why?
What do you think is unfair? What kind of thing do you
think is the most unfair? Why?
FOLLOW UP SCORE SHEET
Name Sex F
Age Score
1.
Answer: A
C. Reason
B
2.
Answer: A
C. Reason
B
3.
Answer: A B
C. Reason:
4. Answer: A.
B.
C. Reason for B.
D. What should be done?
5. Answer: A (please circle one) 123
B: Reason:
C. (Please circle one) 123
D. Reason for C
6. Answer:
Reason:
7. Answer: A.
B. Reason:
8. Answer: A.
B. Reason:
9. Answer: A.
B.
C. Reason:
10. Answer: A.
B. Reason:
Total Score
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APPENDIX B-4
Scoring Criteria
Clinical interview questions may be used to determine the
child's reasoning level. It is best to probe the child's
stated reason to be certain of its exact meaning to the
child. The entire interview should be tape recorded.
Answers which indicate a unilateral, literal, interpretation
of adult authority, moral realism, are scored 0.
Answers which indicate reciprocity, equality, cooperation
and/or awareness of intentions in moral judgments are
scored 1.
Answers which indicate awareness of equity and/or extenuat-
ing circumstances are scored 2.
1. Ojbective responsibility
No consideration of intention, equality guilt = 0.
Intentionally, one more morally guilty by reason
of intent =1.
Need of poor child, equity = 2.
2 .
EXAMPLE
No consideration of intention, equally guilty - 0-
"Yes, they are equally guilty. They're both the
same, they both stole and they both ran away.
Intentionally, one more morally guilty by reason^
" Joey isbetter , he had a good thought in his mind,
"joey is not so guilty cause he wants to keep his
friend. She is definitely guilty cause she s
just
thinking of herself."
_ 2
.
Equity, need of poor child
"The girl was worse. She had no reason.
joey did cause the little boy was poor.
"The qirl was worse. She stole for hersel
and she didn't really need it but the
poor
boy did .
"
Objective responsibility and what constitutes a
lie
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No consideration of intention, equally guilty = 0.
More improbable story, more guilty= 0.
Intentionally considered in moral judgment = 1.
EXAMPLE
No consideration of intention, equally guilty = 0.
"Both the same, both lies."
"Both guilty, lies are always the same."
More improbable story, more guilty
"The big dog is worse, there's no such thing
as a dog that big."
Intentionally considered in moral judgment
"Both wrong but not equally the same.
One was scared but the other one wanted a
reward.
"
"The boy who knew the streets was worse. The
other boy didn't mean to do it."
Use probe questions about lies to determine if child
considers
a lie wrong because it is punished by adults or because
it
is untrue. What is a lie? Why do people tell lies?
Is
it worse to lie to an adult or to somebody your own
age.
Why or why not? If child believes it is wrong to
lie to
both peers and adults score 2 on question number two.
EXAMPLE
Sample answers to probe questions
"A lie is when you tell something that
"It is worse to lie to grown ups. they
isn't true,
can punish
"Worse to lie to a grown up cause he 11
find ou
^
and you'll get in trouble. Your friend won
t know.
"It's the same to lie to grown ups and
friends.^
^
A lie is a lie.
3. Immanent justice or fair - 0
Coincidence = 1.
EXAMPLE
Immanent justice or fair punishment
"No. Maybe like God, something had
happens
cause he took the apples.
. punish
"Yes. If you do something bad God
will
you.
= 0
It
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Coincidence = 1.
"Yes, the bridge was rotten and it wasn't
safe .
"
"No, he would have been more careful, he
wouldn't have to hurry. He was sneaking so
the teacher wouldn't see him.
4. Collective punishment
Unilateral, any punishment determined by adult
fair = 0.
Expiatory punishment = 1.
Restitutive punishment = 2.
EXAMPLE
Unilateral, any punishment determined by an
adult is fair =
"They were all throwing snowballs so they
should all be punished."
Expiatory punishment = 1
"The whole class, if nobody told her she'd
have to punish the whole class or the boy
would get away with it."
"Not really the whole class, but the teacher
can't leave something broken and not punish
nobody-the whole class then"
.
Restitutive punishment = 2
"He should tell and say he was sorry and pay
for it. If she's nice she won't punish whole
class cause only one person did it.
5. Expiatory and restitutive punishment
Most severe punishment, most just-expiatory
punishment = 0
.
Restitutive punishment = 1.
Restitute punishment with consideration of the
injured party's point of view = 2.
EXAMPLE
Most severe punishment, most just expiatory
punishment . . .
,
"Not all are fair. Fairest not to play with
his toys for a whole week. It wouldn t be
fair to make him give up one of^his own toys
or nice to make him pay for it."
0 .
1 .
"Fairest not to play with his toys cause he
disobeyed his father."
Restitutive punishment
"All are fair but paying to fix it is fairest
because he broke it."
Restitute punishment with consideration of the
injured party's feelings
"All are fair but paying is the fairest cause
one of his toys might not be what the little
brother wants. He might want his own toy."
Distributive justice
Deference to the older as superior = 0.
Equality = 1.
Equity = 2.
EXAMPLE
Deference to older as superior
^
"Big kid needs the food cause he's bigger.
Equality
"Just the same, equal best so they won t fight
Equity
"A little more for the little one cause he
doesn't have as much strength."
"Little one should have a headstart, he has
shorter legs."
0 .
1 .
2 .
Justice
Expiatory punishment = 0.
Equality = 1.
EXAMPLE
= 0
Expiatory punishment |t
"Nothing to eat, he fooled around.
"Nothing, why should others give any to him,
he was fooling around. He could of drowned
th em ** ,i
"Fair, obedient one deserves the biggest
piece."
= 1
"Mother*should like the children equally J^need
6 ’
"Not fair, both should have the same. Both
nee
the same amount of love." f . „
"If everybody gave him some that would be
air.
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8. Adult authority and equality
Adult authority overrides equality of treatment = 0.
Equality of treatment = 1.
Cooperation overrides inequality = 2.
EXAMPLE
Adult authority overrides equality of treatment = 0.
"Fair. The father could have been annoyed by
the other boy complaining."
"Fair. If you complain you might get hit but
if you don't complain everyone is happier."
"Shouldn't say anything cause a grown-up is telling
him- if he says anything the grown-up might punish
him. "
Equality of treatment = 1
"Not really fair. He should do it but then the
other boy should do part of his work."
"Even though he didn’t mind he shouldn't have to
do all the work. It should be the same. He should
tell his father."
"She shouldn ' t -go . I'd say I did my job, you
do yours .
"
, ^
Cooperation overrides inequality
"Not fair to ask but girl should go and do it
to help the leader." .
"Not fair. Other boy didn't like to do it either
but he did it to cooperate and make his father
happy. He should tell his father."
9. Reciprocal generosity and punishment
Expiatory
Reciprocal
punishment =0
.
generosity superior to punishment 1 .
EXAMPLE
"Throne
7
who was punished told the trut^
a
^er
he didn't want to get punished again.
The oth
one would think he (the father) didn't
punish me
before so he won't punish me this tim .
"The one who was talked to (lied) . he • s be
afraid to tell a lie cause he didn t
think
»?he
S
one'who had been talked to, they didn’t
punish
him good enough so he would understand.
0
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Reciprocal generosity superior to punishment = 1.
"The one who had been punished (lied) . The other
boy understood more cause his mother talked to
him. "
"The one who was talked to learned his lesson.
Punished one wanted revenge (kept pencil)."
10. Unfair punishment = 0.
Inequality of treatment (usually stated in terms of
siblings) = 1.
Social Injustice = 2.
EXAMPLE
Unfair punishment
"Staying in my room the whole day."
"Getting punished for something I didn't do."
Inequality of treatment
"When my sister got a barracuda (jacket) and
I didn't."
"When my brother gets more presents than I do."
Social injustice
"When a black kid is playing with a white kid
and someone says don't play together. That's
not fair to the black kid or the white kid. They
should all play together."
"If three boys start a game and one leaves in the
middle. Then the others can't play cause the
game is ruined."
"When big kids kick a little kid's ball and play
keep away. I told them to leave him alone he s
only a little kid.
"
= 0 .
= 1 .
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APPENDIX B-5
Interrater Training Procedures
All subjects were pre, post and follow-up tested
individually by the researcher. Each interview was tape
recorded on a Panasonic tape recorder. The subjects spoke
into a Realistic Tip Clip Mike (Cat. No. 33-1058) from
Radio Shack.
Tow master teachers agreed to serve as independent
raters. The scoring criteria was explained to them in a
joint session. Each rater listened to two taped interviews,
and recorded the subjects responses on score sheets. They
then scored the protocols according to the scoring criteria
(see Appendix B-4 ) under the researchers supervision until
agreement reached 85%.
All pre and post test interviews had been scored pre-
viously by the researcher. Raters were given randomly
assigned tapes, five each of the pre and post test interviews
which they were asked to record and score independently.
Scoring was blind. Raters did not know which were control
subjects and how the researcher had scored their responses.
Examples of other subjects responses and scores were not
available to the interviewer. The tapes and the independent
ratings were returned to the researcher.
Interrater reliability on the pre test was .95. Interrater
reliability on the post test was .966. The same procedure was
used for the follow-up test scoring. Scoring five protocols
interrater reliability on the follow-up test was .95.
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APPENDIX C-l
Orientation Meeting
Time - 30 minutes
I. Introductions
A. Mothers
as parents arrive, researcher should welcome them
and introduce herself. Once they have all arrived
have each mother introduce herself to the group.
B. Researcher
1. Personal history and background - former
school psychologist in the Dedham Schools. At
present consultant to the schools while doing
doctoral studies in child development and school
psychology at the University of Massachusetts.
Resided in Milton, married and parent of six
children.
2. Reason for research - While all the research
emphasizes the influential roles of parents and
family in the moral development of children and
extensive studies have been made about the effects
of different parenting styles on children's
social and moral development, very little research
had been done communicating the findings to
parents. The studies have generally been observa-
tional and descriptive of the parents' role.
The parent education programs that were review-
ed focused on the child management problems of
every day, going to bed on time, getting homework
done, etc. None of the ones that the researcher
reviewed gave the parents an understanding of the
child's moral development as a process and how
they can and do influence this process
.
The moral education programs have focused main-
ly on adolescents and the school's role in advanc-
ing their moral reasoning as citizens in a
democracy. The changes in our society _ alarm many
of us as parents. As parents we are vitally
concerned about how to bring up responsible and
moral children.
The purpose of this research is to bring to
gether what had been learned about moral develop-
ment and moral education on one hand and parent
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training and interventions on the other hand.
The research project is designed to see if a
short-term parent program will be effective in
advancing the moral reasoning of children because
most parents even though they are caring and
concerned, simply do not have the time for a long
program. It is the researcher's belief that
parents' love for their children makes them the
best moral educators of their children and that
on behalf of their children parents can quickly
master and implement new techniques.
II. Overview of the Project
A. All data is confidential and independent of the
school
.
1. results will be reported in statistical
form
2. neither the children's nor the parents' names
will be used in any reporting of data
3. interviews of the children assess only the
child's level of reasoning, i.e., why the
child thinks an act is right or wrong, not an
assessment of the child's moral character or
behavior
.
B. Explanation of research design
1. experimental and control groups
2. random assignment to groups
3. control group as important as the experimental
group in the research to evaluate the effect-
iveness of the parent training program
4. parents assigned to the control group will be
invited to participate in the training program
in the fall after the three month follow-up
testing of all the children
5. validity of the research depends upon the
control parents continuing to interact with
their children as they have in the past
6. all the children will be pre, post and follow-
up tested to measure the effectiveness of the
training program
7. pre-tests of the children will not be scored
until after experimental and control group
assignments are made but all children were
found to be very sensitive to issues of right
and wrong and that every pajrent can feel
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confident about her child and the child'sjudgment about right and wrong on the things
that are typical in the life of a third
grader.
C. Availability of the researcher-The researcher
will be available at anytime for any quest-
ions parents in either group might have.
Researcher's phone number and address given
to all parents.
III. Parent Information Forms - All parents (See Appendix
C-2-)
A. Childs name and date of birth.
B. Number and ages of siblings.
C. Formal religious instruction, if any.
D. Mother's employment.
E. Number of adults in the home other than adult
siblings
.
F. Interest in participating in fall training
program if assigned to control group.
IV. Assignment to groups
A. All the children's names were placed in a con-
tainer which will be passed for each parent
present to draw from in turn until fifteen names
are drawn for the experimental group assignment.
B. Re-emphasize to control group parents that they
are an essential part of the study that their
children will be interviewed again for a post-
test immediately after the training program and
again in three months for a follow-up test to
determine results of training program oyer time,
and that the training program will be given to
them after the follow-up testing.
V. Questions from the parents
VI. Thank all the parents for their interest and cooper-
ation.
Control group mothers may leave if they wish but
are welcome to stay too, since the only other item
to be discussed is the meeting dates and times for
the experimental group.
A.
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B. Experimental group determines dates for four
consecutive training meetings.
1. most convenient day and time.
2. baby sitting needs, if any.
VII. Adjourn
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APPENDIX C-2
Parent Information Sheet
CHILD'S NAME:
DATE OF BIRTH:
NUMBER AND AGES OF SIBLINGS:
FORMAL RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION:
MOTHER'S EMPLOYMENT:
NUMBER OF ADULTS IN THE HOME:
If you are a control group mother are you interested in
attending the parent program in the fall:
Are daytime or evening meetings best for you?
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appendix d-i
First Training Meeting
Time: 1 hour, Tape recorded
Objectives
:
1. Understanding of moral reasoning as a developmental
process characterized by levels.
2. -Role of parents in the moral development of children.
3. Uses of induction and dilemma stores to stimulate
advances in moral reasoning
Materials
:
1. Charts: Piacet and Kohlbera Levels and Staces (see
Table 1)
.
Parent Practices (see Table II)
Damon Positive Justice Levels (see Appendix D-4)
.
Parent folders for each parent's handouts and notes, log.
Handouts: copies of above charts, log sheets, Parent
Procedures, Roger's Dilemma and Probe Questions, 6 Brady
Dilemmas (see Appendices D3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11).
I Overview of Cognitive Developmental Theory of Moral
Development - lo minutes
a. Piaget and Kohlberg (see Appendix D-3) .
b. Damon Positive Justice Levels (see Appendix D-4)
c. Each parent receives a copy for future reference.
II Overview of the Role of Induction and Its Use in Moral
Education - 5 minutes
a. Kohlberg method to advance moral reasoning stage
(see Appendix D-2) .
b. Correlates of moral development and parent practices
(see Appendix D-7)
.
HI. Overview of the Role of Parents in the Moral Development of
Their Children - 5 minutes (see Appendix D-6) .
a. Chart for each parent. .
. „
b. Reemphasize role of rules and parent guidance during
latency
Overview of Mothers' Tasks for Project - 10 minutes
a. Parent Procedures (see Appendix D-8) .
b. Explain each procedure.
IV.
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V. Presentation of Roger's Dilemma and Probe Questions
(see Appendix D-9, 10).
VI. Conclusion
A. Coming agenda
1. Short presentation each week of new material
2. Weekly workshop to practice presenting dilemmas
and asking probe questions.
B. Assignment for 1st week
1. Listen for different levels of reasoning in their
children's replies.
2. Present one dilemma story each day to the
experimental child and ask:
a. What is the main character's problem?
b. What do you think the main character should
do?
c. Why should that be done?
*d. DO NOT EVALUATE THE CHILD'S REPLY.
C. Make a log entry of the time spent each day.
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APPENDIX D-2
Cognitive Developmental Theory
Piaget
Piaget (1965) describes the process of moral matura-
tion as an evolution of moral judgment. Moral judgment
changes as children grow older. Children begin with a
morality of constraint which is based on external auth-
ority and rigid interpretation of rules and pass to a
morality of cooperation with judgments based on social
considerations and flexible interpretations of rules.
Changes in attitudes toward rules reflect changes in
children's cognitive structures and changes in their
social interactions.
Piaget says the essence of morality is the conscious-
ness of obligation to a systems of rules. Between 4 to 7
children judge the morality of an act in terms of its
consequences. (Example) Usually between 6 to 8 children
reach the stage of moral relativism when they are beginning
to evaluate the intent of the action. Rules always impose
restraints upon children, but the reasons for accepting
the limitations change as children develop.
Preoperational children (2 to 7 years) make judgments
based on concrete perceptual information. During this
stage children's morality is a morality of constraint.
The sense of right and wrong is based on dependency and
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submission to authority figures. Things are moral in
relation to the rules. Rules are imposed by the adult.
Children's moral values, like the rules, are seen to
originate outside of themselves . Whether they obey or
disobey the rightness of an adult rule or command is not
questioned. Any disobedience is wrong at this stage.
Intention is not considered only the final outcome or
consequence is considered in making judgments.
Younger children may be able to discriminate between
unintentional and intentional in their own behavior but
their egocentricity prevents them from taking another's
perspective. .Another's behavior is judged by outcome. The
amount of damage determines the gravity of the behavior
rather than the intention. Good is rigidly defined as
obedience; it demands that the letter rather than the
spirit of the law be observed. Most children cannot make
the distinction between the adult's scolding about material
damages from a clumsy act and a moral fault. In spite
of the adult's intentions the objective responsibility
imposes itself on the child's mind.
The next level of moral development Piaget designates
as morality of cooperation. It comes from the voluntary
acceptance of the group norms. Piaget states that notions
of justice and solidarity develop as a function of the
mental age of the child. This period coincides with
operational thought. Operational children (7 to 12 years)
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are limited to reasoning about events in their immediate
or past experiences. Their cognitive structures now
permit them to see events from more than one oerspective
and this role-taking ability allows them to evaluate an
action by its intention. Moral judgments are increasingly
based on motive. The concept of justice changes from
punitive to res'titutive
.
Younger children measure the gravity of a lie not by
its motives but in terms of the falseness of its statement
just as they judge actions by material results. This
diminishes as children grow older. Children between five
and seven years do not distinguish between error and
deceit, to them all false statements are "lies". Around
eight years the distinction between a mistake and a lie
is generally understood. It was not until age ten to
eleven years that Piaget's subjects defined a lie as an
intentionally false statement intended to deceive.
While Piaget believed most children learn cooperation,
justice and fairness from peer interactions and the rules
of games, he also believed that when parents try to give
their children a moral education based on intention, their
children advance more rapidly in moral reasoning. "There
is not doubt that by adopting a certain technique with
their children, parents can succeed in making them attach
more importance to intentions than to rules conceived as
a system of ritual interdictions" (p. 137 ) .
Kohlberg
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From longitudinal studies and interviews with child-
ren of all ages and backgrounds as they explained their
judgments about hypothetical moral dilemmas Kohlberg
elaborates six stages of moral development (Table 1 )
.
Just as logical reasoning is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for mature moral judgment, mature
moral judgment is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for mature moral action. It was found that moral judgment
is the most influential but not the only factor in moral
behavior. According to the moral development theory of
Kohlberg, as an individual attains higher levels of moral
reasoning there is greater congruence between reasoning
and behavior.
In the cognitive-developmental view, morality is the
natural outcome of a universal human tendency toward
empathy and concern for justice, reciprocity or equality
in human relationships. Conventional morality defines
good behavior within a given culture. (Example) Decisions
based on universal principles are those on which all humans
could agree.
Basic moral principles are independent of specific
religious doctrines. (Example: dogma different from
morality) . No differences in the development of moral
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thinking were found between athiests and believers,
Christians, Moslems, Jews or Buddhists. The data collect-
ed do not indicate that all values are universal but that
basic moral values are universal.
The educational method to advance moral reasoning to
higher levels is the use of moral discussion to:
1. expose the child to the next higher stage of
reasoning
.
2. expose the child to situations, posing problems
and contradictions with the child's current
moral structure, leading to dissatisfaction with
the current level.
3. to create an atmosphere of open exchange and
dialogue to compare conflicting moral views.
The moral atmosphere which fosters moral development
is one which encourages role taking and provides opportun-
ities to take the other's point of view. This is related
to social interaction, communication and the child's sense
of efficacy in influencing the attitudes of others. The
other condition of the social atmosphere is the level of
justice in the environment, the perceived way rewards and
punishments are distributed, rules and privileges imposed.
Kohlberg and his associates theorized that in a "just
community" where real-life moral situations are discussed
as issues of fairness and as matters of democratic
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decisions, the child will be stimulated to advance in
both moral reasoning and moral action. A participatory
democracy is believed to provide more role taking
opportunities than does any other social arrangement. The
sense of community improves morale and seems to lead to
positive behavior change. Kohlberg sees this "just
community" as based in the school of kibbutz (Reimer,
1977) although there is no reason that the same atmosphere
and conditions cannot be achieved within the family.
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APPENDIX D-3
Levels and Stages of Moral Development
Piaget Level Kohlberg Stage
I. Premoral level
II. Morality of convent-
ional role conformity
III. Morality of self-
accepted moral
principles
Punishment and obedience
orientation
Naive instrumental hedonism
Good boy morality of main-
taining good relations,
approval of others
Authority maintaining
morality. Law and order
Morality of contract and of
democratically accepted law
Morality of invididual
principles of conscience
1 .
2 .
3.
4 .
5.
6 .
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Level 0-
Level 0-
Level 1-
Level 1-
Level 2
Level 2
APPENDIX D-4
*
Damon Early Positive Justice Levels
i: Choice comes from child's wish. Peasons
state the choices instead of trying to just-
ify them (I should get it because I want it.)
Fairness is confused with child's wishes.
3: Choices still reflect child's wishes but now
the choices are justified by some external
characteristics of the person (We should get
the most because we are girls.) Choices are
still for the self.
A: Choices are from strict equality. (Everyone
should get the same.) Rigid and inflexible.
B: Choices based on merit. People should be paid
back for doing good or bad things. Still
rigid and inflexible. Fairness is confused
with deserving.
A: Understanding the different people have
different needs (the poor) . Choices try to
make things equal (He should get the most,
but she should get some, too) . Fairness
confused with compromise.
-B: Child sees the claims of other people and
tries to take all the circumstances into
account. Choices made for the particular
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situation after considering all claims
.
(People who work hardest deserve the most
because that way everyone is encouraged to
work harder)
.
* Adapted from Table 1, Brief Description of Early
Positive Justice Levels, William Damon, The Social
World of the Child. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Publishers , 1979 . p. 75
.
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APPENDIX D-5
Induction
Induction regarding the parent means appeals to the
child's potential for guilt by expressing hurt, disappoint-
ment by the parent as consequences of the child's behavior.
Induction regarding peers means pointing out to the child
the consequences of his behavior in terms of the other
child's feelings.
A pattern of affection with infrequent use of power
assertion and frequent use of induction facilitated the
facets of morality included in this study, internal moral
judgment, acceptance of responsibility, consideration of
other children. Induction focuses the child's attention
on the consequences of the child's behavior on others.
This distinction is considered important in determining
the content of the child's standards. Implied in induct
ion is the means of reparation. Induction is seen as the
method most capable of enlisting the child's natural
tendency for empathy. Researchers believe the coalescence
of empathy and the awareness of being the causal agent
should produce a social conscience.
Power assertion is least effective in promoting the
development of moral standards and internalization
of
controls because it elicits intense anger in
the child and
provides a model for expressing hostility. It
serves to
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inhibit feelings of empathy. It promotes expectations
of punitive responses from adult authorities and thereby
contributes to an external moral orientation.
Induction is the most facilitative form of discipline
for building long term controls which are independent of
external sanctions.
149
APPENDIX D-6
Parent Role in the Moral Development of Children
Many investigators have reported the importance of
parental reasoning with the child. Hoffman proposed that
induction, the parent pointing out the consequences of
the child's behavior to others, is the most important
antecedent to internalizing values and corresponding
behaviors. Parents who reason with their children and
use other-oriented induction communicate the importance
of the welfare of others. Piaget (1965) refers to the
parents' role in developing the child's awareness of
intentionalit’y versus material consequences in moral
reasoning as a function of the parents' verbal communicat-
ions with the child. Parents' induction and children's
socially responsible behavior was correlated. Induction
can elicit empathy in the child and communicate to the
child that he or she has a responsibility to others. It
seems evident that parental induction will facilitate
the child's role-taking ability which Piaget (1965) says
is a major factor in the development of moral reasoning.
Another aspect of parental reasoning to consider as
an influence on their children's moral development is
the
research of Kohlberg and his associates that exposure
to
a higher stage of reasoning stimulates cognitive
dis-
equilibrium and stage advance.
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A study of boys with a high degree of self-esteem
found they were successful socially. They led rather than
merely listened to discussions. They were eager to express
opinions and did not sidestep disagreements. They were
not particularly sensitive to criticism. They were
leaders instead of followers. Coopersmith ' s findings
suggest that the ability to participate in and lead
Kohlberg-type moral reasoning discussions has its ante-
cedents in the home life and family structure of the
student rather than in the classroom atmosphere. The
"just community" concept (Power and Reimer, 1978) may be
viewed as an. effort to replicate in the school, the
conditions Coopersmith describes as the well-structured
family environment.
Both Coopersmith (1968) and Baumrind (1975) reported
that parents of the children with positive socialization
set high standards and explicit behavior expectations for
their children. Authoritative parents had clear ideas
about how they wanted their children to behave. In an
analysis of parental control and guidance procedures, it
has been found that a basic theory or philosophy is requir-
ed for the parent to unite and modify strategies over time
as the child grows and matures. This consistency over
time communicates to the child that reason not impluse
supports the parents ' value system.
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A child's home life plays a major role in his
selection of friends. If the family ties are strong and
affectionate
,
they become a "bulwark against antisocial
influences from neighborhood or peer groups". The
s el f-selection of peer associates and its relationship
to the parent-child relationship and parent-style
variables is of particular significance when considering
Piaget's emphasis on the role of peer interactions in the
moral development of the child.
Numerous research studies have been made relating
parent practices of moral development in children. Power
assertion by the mother was related to weak moral develop-
ment in their children. The use of induction by the
mother was consistently related to advanced moral develop-
ment.
Two parent practices which were noted in all studies
of moral development in children were affection and
discipline. The children with advanced moral development
perceived their parents as approving, affectionate,
advising and participating in child-centered activities.
(Table 11)
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APPENDIX D-7
Correlates of parent practices and the moral development of
their children
Positive Negative
I. Affection
warmth and nurturance
sensitivity and resonsiveness
interest in the child's welfare
acceptance
II. Discipline
low power assertion Power assertion
high standards and expectations love withdrawal
induction-consequences of child's harsh punishment
behavior
consistent, firm enforcement of rules
III. Communication
accessible
listening
reasoning
explanations for demands
democratic decision making
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APPENDIX D-8
Sample Procedure for Parents
1. Choose a quiet time when you and your child can talk without
interruption
.
2. Present the dilemma story to your child.
3. Ask your child to repeat the story to you.
4. Ask your child what he/she thinks is the story character's
problem.
5. Ask your child w.hat he/she thinks the main character should
do
.
* REMEMBER NOT TO EVALUATE YOUR CHILD'S ANSWER AS RIGHT OR WRONG.
6. Ask your child why he/she thinks that.
7. Ask your child how he/she thinks each character in the story
feels .
8. Ask your child how he/she would feel if he/she were the main
character. Each of the other characters.
9. Suqgest a solution one stage above your child's solution:
What would happen if ? H°w ^°uld
feel? How would the (other characters) feel?
10. Encourage your
dilemmas
.
child to make up and discuss real life
Druska, R. Paulist Press,
1975 .
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APPENDIX D-9
Sample Moral Dilemma Story
WHAT SHOULD ROGER DO?
"But isn't that stealing?" Roger questions, when
Barry took two baseballs from the school kit, and put
them in his bag.
"Aw... no, not really," Barry replied. "It doesn't
really matter if no one ever misses them, .no one will
even know they've been taken, so no one will be upset,
and no questions will be asked."
"You mean you've done it before?" said Roger,
surprised. "Yea," replied Barry, "I've taken four or five
baseballs .. .but stop looking at me as if I'm a criminal
or somethin' .
"
Roger wasn't sure what to think. He thought there
might be something in what Barry said— that stealing was
really only bad if it caused hurt, or if someone missed
the thing that had been stolen. He didn't think much
about what had happened for a few days. The thought of
telling on Barry never came to his mind.
Then one day at school, something happened which
really made Roger think. Barry couldn't find his special
silver pen, and was sure that it had been stolen. "I
remember clearly leaving it on the desk," he said. "Some-
one must have come into the room at recess and taken it.
Barry was right. Someone had taken it, and Barry
found out who it was only by accident. When Andrew was
turning out his pockets, looking for money to pay the lady
at the canteen, the pen had fallen from his pocket onto
the ground. "That's mine!" exploded Barry, who was behind
Andrew in the line.
. ^
But the matter didn't rest there. After shouting for
minutes at Andrew, Barry went to his teacher, and then to
He told everyone what a terrible thing
rmni c? mo r\ +*
.
.it
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can hardly be important, can it?" Roger thought there
was some sense in what Barry said. After all, he had
sometimes told very small lies to save someone from being
hurt. Perhaps this was the same .. .perhaps some kinds of
stealing weren't nearly as bad as others.
What should Roger do?
*Brady
,
L., Do We Dare .
Sidney, Australia
Dymock's Book Arcade Ltd.
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APPENDIX D-10
Sample Questions for Roger's Dilemma
1. Should Roger tell the teacher that Barry stole the base-
balls? Why or why not?
2. Does it matter if Roger and Barry are best friends? Why
or why not?
3. Would it make a difference if Roger wasn't a good friend
of Barry's but everybody liked Barry alot? Why or why not?
4. Is Barry right? Is it okay to take something if nobody
will miss it? Why?
5. Is it different to take something from a friend than to
take something from somebody you don't like? Why?
6. Is it worse to take something from an adult than from
somebody your own age? Why?
7. Suppose you saw a bov/girl from your class with something
of yours what would you do? Why?
3. Did anything like this ever happen to you? What did you do?
Why?
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APPENDIX D-ll
*
The Moral Dilemma Stories
Graham
Graham sees his brother Ken steal, with a good
motive, but when Ken saves his own skin by blaming
another boy, Graham is placed in a quandry.
Alan
When a group of boys breaks a window, Alan thinks
he has been seen and will be held responsible, but
his peers insist that he say nothing.
Keith
Because Keith is forbidden to be at the creek, he
doesn't know whether to intervene to help a boy
being bullied, to seek help, or to do nothing.
John
John knows his peers won't want his younger brother
in their secret club, his parents have ordered him,
under pain of his own exclusion, to admit him.
Robert
. _ ,
,
Robert is torn between relieving the misery of the
school bully by revealing who stole his watch, and
betraying a secret and losing the friendship of his
peers
.
Greg
Greg wonders if it is justified to 'get your own
back' on a bully, by having him unjustly incriminated
in class.
Anne boasts of her prowess once too often, and when
her friends insist that she prove herself, she
feels
that she can't.
Susan
Susan's conflict as to whether to reveal that she
wo
the essay competition by copying from a book,
is
complicated when she learns that the next boy m 1
for the prize also cheated.
Pat
In a desperate bid to finish her Social
Studies
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project, Pat surreptitiously takes a book, intending
to return it the next day, but she ruins the book by
spilling ink on it.
Lyn
Lyn's distress at being rudely teased by her brother,
is worsened when he wins the school modelling com-
petition—by passing her model off as his own.
Carol
When Carol's mother asks her for her hard-earned
babysitting money to buy a present for a sick relative,
Carol only give her half, which isn't enough for the
present her mother had in mind.
Michelle
_
Michelle doesn' t know whether to forego a terrific
party and the friendship of her peers, in order to
make a poor and 'smelly' new girl feel at home in
a strange school.
Phillip
.. ,
Although Phillip and Lindsay are responsible for
breaking a window, an old pensioner believes that
he did it, and has accepted the blame.
Steven
_ ,,
Steven doesn't know whether to escape from the
orchard and save his own skin, or stay with his
friends and suffer the consequences.
Peter
Peter is caught lying, and when he is summoned before
the Principal, doesn't know whether he should explain
his real motive— the fact that he saw his father get
away with a white lie.
William
. ,
,
William's conflict of having to accept one of the
ideologies of his teacher and Principal, is
confused
because of his crush on his teacher.
Brian
Brian doesn’t know whether to admit to taking
and
smoking his father's cigars which h^e caused his
friend to be sick, or to allow his friend
to suffe
in silence.
Sean
Sean deceives his protective mother
in order to
159
escape from being teased as a mummy's boy.
Melanie
Melanie wonders just how far she should go to be-
friend an unresponsive isolate.
Julie
When Julie's twin sister is allowed to go to the
party, and she isn't she contrives it so that her
sister misses out too—and regrets it.
Debbie
Debbie realizes that her boasts with Lisa have caused
the alienation of their respective mothers.
Shirley
Shirley wonders whether her feeling that Karen is
unwittingly using her mother-youth leader to gain
favors, maybe confused with a jealousy of Karen.
Louise
When Louise sees two girls steal, she gives them an
ultimatum to confess, but then finds that she has
been framed.
Bruce
Bruce reports a boy to the Principal for vandalism,
but later learns that his accusation was mistaken.
Sally
Sally doesn't know whether to go out of her way to
help a fat, unpopular girl who won't, or can't help
herself
.
When Ross inadvertently spends the money donated to
the Walk-a-thon, he wonders whether he should change
the donation rates on the card.
Michael
Michae
1
commit,
is tempted to confess a wrong he didn't
to shatter his image as teacher's pet.
Wayne
Wayne disobeys his teacher in a
the scheming Ian has caused Miss
fit of temper because
Fox to doubt his
integrity
.
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Roger
Roger wonders whether to believe that some forms of
stealing are more excusable then others.
*Brady
,
L.
,
"Do We Dare
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APPENDIX E
Second Training Meeting
Time: 1 hour. Tape recorded.
Objectives
:
1. Understanding the role of empathy and role-
taking in advancing moral reasoning and
development
.
2. Practice presenting a dilemma story and asking
probe questions for empathy.
Materials
:
1. Seven Brady stories.
2. Paper and pencils.
I. Review the Role of Empathy and Role-taking-10 minutes
a. As a function of operational thought (see
discussion of Piaget Appendix D-2 )
.
b. Parents role in developing empathy (see
discussion in Hoffman Appendix D-6 and D-7) .
II. Parents' Presentation of Examples of Moral Reasoning
Levels from Their Listening and Observations-5 minutes
III. Presentation of a Brady Dilemma to Whole Group- 10
minutes
a. Have parents formulate questions of empathy and
intentionality
.
b. Have parents develop probe questions using probe
questions from Roger's Dilemma as examples.
IV. Workshop - 20 minutes
a. Divide into groups of three.
b. Role-taking: presenting a Brady Dilemma; asking
probe questions for erapthy , empathatic listening
to replies.
1. one parent playing parent
2. one parent playing child
3. one parent listening for parent's empathy,
giving feedback and recording questions
reverse roles.4 .
162
V. Conclusion
a. Assignment
1. Each day one dilemma presentation to child
following parent procedures.
2. Brief log entry.
b. Review dilemma stories for week's assignment.
This part of the program depends upon the number
of parents in the group. It is hoped that in the
workshop groups the seven dilemmas for the coming
week l s assignment will have each been rehearsed
and questions developed so that the questions
for each story can be shared in this discussion
period.
c. Questions.
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APPENDIX F-l
Third Training Session
Time: 1 hour. Tape recorded.
Objectives
:
1. Improve probe questioning.
2. Recognize level of reasoning.
3. Introduce reasoning one stage/level above the
child's to promote cognitive conflict.
4. Program evaluation to date.
Materials
:
Seven Brady stories.
Damon Positive Justice Levels.
Piaget Level of Reasoning about the Lie (see
Appendix F-2)
.
I. Review Parents Experience - 10 minutes
a. Presenting dilemma stories
b. Children's reactions
c. Parents' reactions.
II. Recognition of Reasoning Levels - 30 minutes
a. Damon's Positive Justice Levels
1. Ask parents for examples of levels of reason-
ing they have recognized in their children's
dilemma discussions or every day experiences.
2. Using a Brady story from coming week's assign-
ment have parents suggest a level one above
the child's.
a. If child insists on strict equality as
^
fairest, introduce into the story conditions
of merit or deserving.
b. If child insists on expiatory punishment,
introduce possibility of restitution.
b. Piaget. Levels of Reasoning about the Lie
a. If child insists a lie is wrong only if
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told to an adult, introduce need for
truth and trust between friends.
b. If child insists all lies equally wrong,
introduce the idea of intention.
III. Workshop - 15 minutes
a. Divide into groups of three - new triads.
b. Role-taking: presenting a Brady dilemma from
coming week's assignment probe questions for
recognizing level of moral reasoning and
introducing a solution at the next higher level
to produce cognitive conflict.
1. one parent playing parent
2. one parent playing child
3. one parent monitor to provide feedback about
recognition of reasoning level and to
record questions.
IV. Conclusion
a. Assignment
1. one Brady dilemma discussion each day with
experimental child introducing higher level
of reasoning than child's.
2. log entries.
Questions
.
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APPENDIX F-2
Piaget Levels of Reasoning About a Lie
Level 1 The lie is wrong because it is the object of
punishment. If there is no punishment then it
isn't a lie.
Level 2 The lie is wrong because it is not true whether
or not it is punished.
Level 3 The lie is wrong because it undermines trust
and affection.
Young children believe it is wrong to lie to adults
but alright to lie to peers because adults, they
believe, know the truth anyway and so they will be
caught and punished, while peers will either believe
them or cannot punish them.
Older children judge a lie by the function or purpose
of the lie, intention. Younger children judge a lie
by the falseness of the statement.
For the young child if the story is believed it is
not a lie. For the older child the seriousness of the
lie is to the degree that it deceives.
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APPENDIX G-l
Fourth Training Meeting
Time: 1 hour. Tape recorded.
Objectives
:
1. Personalizing Brady dilemmas
2. Develop dilemma stories from child's real life
experiences
Materials
:
Seven Brady dilemmas
I. Review findings from research on effectiveness of
real life dilemma discussions in a natural setting
(See Appendix G-2) - 5 minutes.
II. Personalizing a Brady Dilemma - 20 minutes
a. Using Brady stems for story lines.
b. Using child and/or friends in similar dilemma
situation.
c. In full group have each parent make-up a personal-
ized dilemma from a Brady story stem.
III. Developing dilemmas from child's real life experiences
20 minutes
a. Family situations
1. perceived inequalities in treatment with
siblings
,
"unjust punishments"
2. ask parents to supply dilemma issues from
family situations.
b. School situations and play situations
c
.
1. conflicts with authority
2. tattling, when is it fair, when is it not
3. cheating, lying, bullying, fighting,
ganging
up, name calling, being left out/leaving out,
Review role of empathy,
ability to see how other
sense of morality as jus
It is through child's
children feel that their
tice and caring develop.
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IV. Conclusion
a. Assignment
1. one dilemma each day which is personalized
or from child's real life experience
2. log entries
b. This is the last working meeting. Next week we
will meet to evaluate the program and turn in
the log sheets. Researcher will begin post-
testing the children the following week. The
follow-up interviews will be given in September.
In the meantime, please don't discuss the program
and training procedures with others, particularly
control group mothers . The only way to accurate-
ly assess the effectiveness of this method is
to strictly limit the treatment to the experi-
mental group. If you are very careful about this,
.we will have some valuable data about how mothers
can and do effect moral development.
If you cannot come next week, I have some
envelopes with stamps and my address so you can
mail your log sheets to me with your comments
about the program. Wait until a week from today
to mail them so you can make notes about each
day this week working with your child. Next
week we will only meet for half an hour.
I can't thank you enough for participating. I
hope you have enjoyed it as much as I have and
that what we have done here has helped you and
your child.
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APPENDIX G-2
Natural Settings, Real Life Dilemma and Parents as Teachers
Grimes introduced the concepts and discussion
techniques of moral stage development to the mothers of
11 year olds. Children discussing real life problem
stories made significant gain compared to the group
discussing hypothetical dilemmas. Inclusion of the
mothers was presumed to have a powerful effect because
discussions could be extended into the natural setting of
the child's home and family.
The most dramatic gains were made where children
discussed real dilemmas in a natural setting using demo-
cratic methods, i.e., within a moral atmosphere. Socratic
discussion and probing questions were necessary stimulators
for moral growth. When mothers were trained to work with
their children at home, results showed that in a two-week
period children trained one to one by a parent advanced
from objective to subjective responsibility in attri-
bution of intent. Parents who encouraged children to
participate in discussions of moral issues had children
who were higher in moral development. The child advances
in moral reasoning when the parents stimulate the
child's
own cognitive resources. Mature modes of thinking—
moral-
need not be identified or reinforced, only
presented and
the child will spontaneously prefer the more
mature
concepts in an atmosphere of mutual respect where
cognitive disequilibrium is fostered to promote moral
growth and teachers/parent refrained from moralizing.
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Studies by Blatt and Kohlberg suggest that it is
easier to move from preconventional to conventional moral
reasoning at younger ages than in adolescence when Stage
2 reasoning has become fixated.
Studies indicate that a parent intervention using
cognitive-developmental strategies has significant
potential
.
The present study is undertaken to explore this use
of Socratic dialogue using real life dilemmas in the
natural setting of the home in the natural group of the
parent and child when the child is beginning to develop
a social conscience, latency.
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APPENDIX H
Final Meeting
Time: 30 minutes. Tape recorded.
Objectives
:
1. Program evaluation
2 . Termination
I. Program Evaluation
a. Mothers will be asked to write their comments on
their log sheets and give them to the researcher.
b. Open discussion of program
1. Did they receive enough background information?
Too much ?
2. Did they have enough workshop time to practice
* dilemma presentations and questions? Too
much?
3. Were there any aspects that needed more time
and practice to develop?
4. How did the children enjoy participating?
5. Did mothers enjoy interacting with their
children this way?
a. did mother's perceptions of their children
change? How?
b. were other members of the family interest-
ed in what you and your child were doing.
6. Do you think you will continue this kind
of
discussion with your child?
II. Termination
a. Request not to discuss training
program with
other mothers for the sake of study
validity.
b. Appreciation for participation
and cooperation


